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第十九页：Introduction
In order to understand the tactics of the Napoleonic Wars it is necessary to under-
stand both those that preceded them and the structure and inter-relationship of the
three combat arms: infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
The evolutionary history of Napoleonic tactics really begins in the 15th century,
when the pike and the ancestor of the musket fIrst made their appearance. In the
mediaeval period heavily-armoured cavalry, being the dominant combat arm, merrily
rode over the peasant militias, scattering them like chaff before the wind. However,
when the Swiss introduced disciplined bodies of pike-armed infantry, the cavalry of
the period found their prickly hedgehogs more than it could handle.
Early fIrearms, though cumbersome, were found superior to the bow and crossbow
for several reasons. The skill to use a longbow required years of training. Also, the
physical strength necessary to use it suffered dramatically during the privations of a
long campaign. Though using a crossbow did not require the same strength as for a
longbow, it still required considerable training. By contrast the arquebus, and its suc-
cessor, the musket, required no more strength than that necessary to lug it about, and
anyone could be trained to fIre, as accurately as such weapons could fIre, within a day.
The inevitable marriage subsequently occurred, where pike and shot formations oper-
ated together. The arquebusiers sheltered under the protective quills of the pike for-
mation and shot down those cavalry impudent enough to close within range.
It gradually became apparent that the dense formations of pikemen were a waste of
manpower that might more effectively be used as arquebusiers. In addition, the advent
of the tactical use of artillery on the battlefIeld, which found the dense masses of
pikemen irresistible targets, encouraged the abandonment of such formations.
The initial ratio of several pikemen to a single arquebusier (or, later, musketeer)
shrank until the pike had all but vanished, and it fInally disappeared with the introduc-
tion of the plug bayonet, which converted the musket itself into a short pike. The
musketeer could now protect himself from cavalry. However, the plug bayonet had a
disadvantage, in that it was thrust into the muzzle of the musket and prevented it
from being used as a fIrearm. The socket bayonet which subsequently replaced it al-
lowed the musket to still be fIred, being attached by means of a ring which slipped
around the muzzle instead.
With this evolution in weaponry there was also a steady decline in the density of
infantry formations. Pike formations had originally been extremely dense, usually deeper
than they were wide. The theory was that the rear ranks would provide both weight
and replacements for casualties once the pike formation was locked in a 'push-of-pike'
(a shoving contest, where weight counted most), which determined who won the en-
gagement.
引言
为了理解拿破仑的战争策略，我们需知在此之前的战争策略，以及步、骑、炮三个兵种的组织以及他们之间的关系。
拿破仑式战术实际上始于15世纪，即长枪（pike）及滑膛枪（musket）的祖先出现之时。在中世纪之时，全副武装的骑兵是占支配地位的兵种，他们从容欢愉地碾压农民军队，使他们如面对风的谷壳一般烟消云散。然而，当瑞士人引进了极富纪律性且大多数人以长枪武装自己的步兵后，这个时代的骑兵发现，他们更多的是成了满身是刺的刺猬，而不消灭了步兵。
早期的火器，虽然笨重，但由于种种原因，它们比弓和十字弓优秀。掌握使用长弓的技巧需要数年之训练。同时，在一场激烈的战役中，使用之所需的体力是明显的。虽然使用十字弓可以不像使用长弓那般需要极好的体力，但使用之也需要相当多的训练。火绳枪（arquebus）及其后继者滑膛枪（musket），除了将之托起外不需要更多的气力，所有人都能接受训练以使用之，在一天之内便能达到这种武器所能达到的精准度。之后，不可避免的结合发生了——长枪编队同火枪编队在一起并肩作战。刚毛般的长枪编队为火绳枪兵提供了掩护，那些进入火绳枪射程且鲁莽地向编队靠近的骑兵被火绳枪兵打下马来。
逐渐变得明显的是，密集的长枪兵编队是对人力的一种浪费，若将这些人用作火绳枪兵，可能会更高效。此外，炮兵在沙场上的战略运用——这是稠密的长枪兵编队所不能压制之目标——也促使人们将这些编队弃之不用。
最初的比例是数个长枪兵配一位单独的火绳枪兵（亦或是后来的滑膛枪兵），后来逐渐缩小，直到长枪兵完全消失，随着插入式刺刀（plug bayonet，可将滑膛枪转化为一杆短枪）的发明，长枪兵最终退出了历史舞台。现在，滑膛枪兵能够保护自身不受骑兵的袭击了。然而，插入式刺刀有一个缺点，即它是插入滑膛枪的枪口的，这使得枪械不能发射。插座式刺刀（socket bayonet）随后取代之，它使滑膛枪能够继续进行射击，后者用一个置于枪口周围的环状物取而代之。
随着武器的发展，步兵编队的密度也持续下降。长枪编队最初是相当密集的，他们通常集中起来而不是分散开来。【编队运转】的原理是，一旦长枪编队为“push-of-pike（激烈的白刃战，这被认为是最重要的，决定了谁能赢得这场战争）”所牵制，预备队便会为他们提供增援并补充士兵以接替伤员。
第二十页：
With the disappearance of the pike, the push-of-pike was no longer a tactical con-
sideration. The principal considerations were: 1) the density of formation necessary to
repel a cavalry attack; 2) the maximum density of infantry that could safely discharge
their weapons; and s) the method of firing used by formed infantry.
Musketeer formations had started out six-deep. The first three ranks fired with the
first rank kneeling, and the second and third ranks standing. The fourth, fifth and
sixth ranks loaded and, when the first three ranks had fired, rotated forward to assume
the firing position. This six-rank formation was also a vestige of the earlier idea that
a thick formation was ideal for defending against cavalry.
The number of ranks was reduced to three when it was found that the rate of fire
could be improved when the rear ranks did not have to walk forward through the front
three. Simultaneously, the first three ranks were closed up so that the soldiers stood
elbow to elbow, increasing the number of musket discharges per linear foot of front-
age. This change in density did not immediately effect some of the formations in use.
The square, a formation used to repel cavalry, continued to be formed up six-deep by
many nations into the Napoleonic era.
Cavalry itself underwent a change, abandoning the use of ['aNne blanche, or cold
steel. The clash of sword on helm all but died. Heavy cavalry was replaced by reiters,
whose principal weapon was the wheellock or matchlock pistol. Their tactic was the
caracole, in which a cavalry regiment would walk up to the formation selected as its
target. As each rank rode up, it would discharge its pistols into the mass of infantry or
cavalry, wheel away, and reload as the next rank rode up and fired. This system almost
completely supplanted the use of the sword until Gustavus Adolphus revived it by
demonstrating the effectiveness of charging heavy cavalry into other cavalry. How-
ever, the impact of either tactic on a mass of pikemen was still minimal.
The cavalry did not undergo much evolution beyond this. By the French Revolution
almost all of Europe's cavalry was armed with both a sword and a variety of firearms.
The caracole had disappeared, and the principal battlefield tactic of cavalry was, once
again, shock. The use of body-armour had come close to disappearing. In the French
army, for instance, only one of more than 20 heavy cavalry regiments - the Cuirassier
Regiment - continued to wear body-armour. The British army had abandoned it en-
tirely, and a similar trend existed in the rest of Europe. However, this was subse-
quently reversed, and by the end of the Napoleonic Wars there were cuirassiers in the
armies of most of the major European powers.
The evolution of the tactical use of artillery was closely tied to its technological
evolution. Early artillery was heavy, relatively unmanoeuvrable, and very slow firing.
Initially, it was used exclusively as a siege weapon, but this changed. Metallurgy im-
proved the strength and reduced the weight of gun-barrels, allowing an increased rate
of fire and longer ranges. Improved carriage designs, coupled with lower barrel weights,
made the guns more manoeuvrable.
Once the guns could be manoeuvred with some rapidity and could fire more than a
few times a day it was found that masses of pikemen and cavalry provided ideal tar-
gets. Even as the pike formations vanished, improvements in the rate of fire and ma-
noeuvrability of artillery secured its own place on the battlefield. Its tactical use did
not vary once it arrived, and even today its role remains that of destroying any enemy
formation within range.
随着长枪兵离开了历史舞台，“白刃战（即上文的push-of-pike）”便不再成为受考虑的战术。首要的考虑是：（1）编队的密度应足以击退骑兵之袭击：（2）达到最大密度的步兵能够安全地击发他们的武器：（3）步兵列队射击。
滑膛枪兵编队排成六排。第一排跪着，第二、三排站着，前三排如是进行射击。第四、五和六排装填弹药，当前三排射击之后，他们便到达射击位置，循环往复。六排编队是早期设想的残留——密集的编队适合用来抵御骑兵。
人们发现将排数减至三时，能够提高射击速率，预备队无需再绕过前三排【而到达射击位置】。同时，三排士兵都相互接近，手肘碰手肘，以便能增加每条前方阵线上火绳枪的数目。这种密度上的转变并没有立即影响一些使用中的编队。方阵，一种用来抵御骑兵的编队，许多拿破仑时代的国家仍然将军队排成六排的方阵。
骑兵自身也经历了一场转变，他们放弃了使用骑兵矛（l'arme blanche），或者说是冷兵器（cold steel）。以剑（sword）攻击头盔（helm），几乎足以使人殒命。重骑兵为手枪骑兵（reiters）所取代，后者的主要武器是燧发或是火绳手枪。他们的战术是半旋转（caracole）——一个骑兵团向预先选定的目标行进，每排骑兵冲上前去，击发手枪，射击步兵团或骑兵团，接着撤走，重新装填弹药，下一排骑兵冲上前去进行射击。这个系统使得剑几乎被完全弃之不用，直到古斯塔夫•阿道夫斯（Gustavus Adolphus）通过证明重骑兵冲击其他骑兵的功效而使之重新复活。然而，用这两种战术来对付长枪兵团时，所产生的效果是微乎其微的。
除此之外，骑兵不曾经历过什么重大发展。在法国大革命之前，几乎所有的欧洲骑兵都只装备一把剑和各种各样的火器。半旋转战术退出了历史舞台，冲击再度成为骑兵的主要战阵之术。护甲（body-armour）的使用已趋近消失。例如，在法国军队的二十多个骑兵团中，只有一个骑兵团——胸甲骑兵团（the Cuirassier Regiment）——仍在装备护甲。英国军队已完全不装备护甲，欧洲的剩余部分也存在着相似的趋势。然而，紧随而来的确是逆转，到了拿破仑战争的末期，欧洲大部分国家的军队中都存在着胸甲骑兵。
炮兵战术的发展与技术的发展息息相关。早期的大炮是沉重的，相当难以控制，射速十分缓慢。最初，它只是一种城战武备，但发生了变化。冶炼工业改善了大炮的强度，减轻了炮管的重量，增加了射速和射程。伴随着炮管减轻的是马车设计的改善，这使得大炮更加机动灵活。
一旦大炮能够快速机动且在一天中能快速发射，将长枪兵与骑兵聚成团变成了不切实际的战术。当长枪编队消失之时，大炮的射速和机动性的提高保护了它自身。一旦大炮到达，它的战术用途便固定下来，即使在今天，它的任务仍是摧毁射程内的所有敌军编队。
第二十一页
Chapter 1
The Basics of
Napoleonic Infantry
In 1792 there were two basic types of infantry: line and light. The term 'heavy infan-
try' is not appropriate for this period and had long since disappeared from use. Infan-
try units carried several different names, depending on the nation which raised them,
but generally line infantry consisted of any infantry formation known as infanterie de
ligne, infantry, musketeers, grenadiers or guards. Light infantry consisted of any for-
mation known as chasseurs,jagers,jreiwilliger jagers, pandors, schutun, infanterie ligere or
light infantry. The term 'fusilier', unfortunately, can denote either. There were some
exceptions. The British fusilier regiments were not light infantry, while many nations
had light infantry as part of their guard formations. It should be clearly understood
that there are almost always exceptions to any rule one might establish for this period.
The distinction between line and light infantry was that the light infantry was
trained to operate in skirmish formations, and the line infantry was trained to stand in
the 1ine of battle'. The skirmish formation was a loose line of infantry, in which they
operated relatively free of rigid control. They operated in pairs and several paces
apart They hid behind rocks and bushes when they fought, and were used to harass
the enemy line infantry as well as to screen their own. Light infantry could, if re-
quired, operate as line infantry and, depending on the nation, did so to greater or
lesser degrees.
The line infantry operated under very strict discipline. They stood elbow to elbow,
marched in step to the cadence of drums, fired controlled volleys, and used all the
various manoeuvres and formations that will be discussed later. In contrast to the free-
spirited skirmishers, the line infantry were often beaten and held in formation by their
officers and NCOs.
In the armies of some nations there were some minor equipment differences be-
tween the light and the line infantry. The uniforms would often vary, with green being
the most common colour for elite light infantry. Many armies issued rifles to their
light infantry, but it was rare for an entire light battalion to be totally thus equipped.
The British were one of the few nations to do this, with the 5160th and 95th Rifles
being equipped with rifles since their formation, while as the wars progressed the
KGL light battalions steadily increased the number of rifles in their ranks until every
man carried one. However, British light infantry regiments rarely carried rifles. The
many German states equipped only one-third of their light infantry with rifles, and in
the French army only the sergeants in the voltigeur companies of the light infantry
battalions carried rifles. Some German states also issued rifles to men in the light
companies of their line regiments. Those men who were not issued rifles usually car-
ried the same musket as the line infantry.
第一章：拿破仑时期的步兵的基本要素
在1792年，有两种基础种类的步兵：线列兵和轻步兵。“重步兵”这个术语并不适合于这个时代，他们已经离开历史舞台很久了。步兵部队有多种不同的名字，这视召集他们的国家而定，但通常来说，由线列兵组成的步兵编队被称作“infanterie de ligne（即法语中的线列兵）”、“musketeers（滑膛枪兵）”、“grenadiers（掷弹兵）”或“guard（近卫军）”。由轻步兵组成的步兵编队被称作“chasseurs（猎兵）”、“Jagers（德语中的猎兵）”、“freiwilliger Jagers”、“pandors”、“schützen”、“infanterie légère”或“light infantry（轻步兵）”。不幸的是，“燧发枪兵（fusilier）”这个术语可以表示两者中的任意一者，但存有例外。英国的燧发枪兵团不是轻步兵，但许多国家都有轻步兵，并将之作为自己的卫戍部队的一部分。我们需知，确立于这个时代的规则总是不乏例外的异类。【文中的jagers之a实如楼下，但本人不会发】
线列兵和轻步兵的区别是，轻步兵受训以在散兵编队中作战，而线列兵受训以在“战线（line of battle）”中作战。散兵编队是由步兵组成的宽散战线，他们处于严格的指挥之下，活动相对较自由。他们成双地活动，彼此相距数步。战斗之时，他们藏在岩石和灌木丛之后，以之掩护自身并反复袭扰敌军的线列兵。如果需要的话，轻步兵可以像线列兵一样战斗，这视国家或军阶高低而定。
线列兵在极其严酷的纪律之下作战。他们肘碰肘地站着，随着鼓的节奏步调一致地行军，一齐射击，使用多种多样的策略和队形，我们将在之后讨论这些。相比于自由自在的散兵，线列兵时常被击败，他们的军官和军士时常用队形约束他们。
一些国家的军队中，轻步兵和线列兵的装备存在着少许不同。军服时常变换，精英轻步兵通常穿绿色的军服。许多军队将步枪分发给他们的轻步兵，但很少全面装备一个轻步兵营。英国是少数几个这样做的国家之一，第六十团第五营和第九十五来复枪团自建立起便装备了步枪，随着战争发展，KGL（King's German Legion，王家德意志团）轻步兵营配备了更多的步枪，直到人手一把。然而，英国的轻步兵团很少携带步枪。许多日耳曼国家只给他们三分之一的轻步兵装备了步枪，在法军中，只有轻步兵营的散兵连队（voltigeur companies）的军士才携带步枪。一些日耳曼国家也将步枪配备给线列兵团的轻步兵连队的战士。不装备来复枪的人通常装备同线列兵一样的滑膛枪
第二十二页
If a rifle was carried the light infantry would either have a different bayonet or no
bayonet at all. Aside from these minor differences of uniform, weapon, and bayonet,
the light infantryman was fundamentally a line infantryman who was taught to fight
in skirmish formation.
Line infantry
~n ord~r to full~ understand line infantry and its operations it is necessary to examine
Its basIc formation, manoeuvring techniques, firing systems, and other significant char-
acteristics. The line infantry was the summation of these characteristics and without
a good understanding of them it is impossible to understand why things were done as
they were.
When infantry formed up it was a universal practice that this was done in three
ranks. The British two-rank exception (and a French exception) will be discussed
later, but it should be noted that even their regulations, right through to 1815, speci-
fied that they be formed up in a three-deep formation. In all armies the tallest men
were placed in the front rank. They were ranked from right to left in most armies but
the British ranked them from the flank to the centre. The next tallest were plac~ in
the third rank and the shortest were in the middle or second rank.
This might seem illogical, because it would have short men trying to fire over the
heads of taller men, but this was not the case. In this period very tall hats were worn,
and the fire was ?etween the front rank's soldiers, not over their heads. By placing the
shorter men behmd them the muskets of the second rank would be as far as possible
from the ears of the taller front rank men. The idea of having a musket detonate right
next to one's ear is enough to cause one to flinch with anticipated pain, so logic would
suggest that if the men were not to suffer ear damage, and if they were to hear the
commands of their officers, the noise of the firing needed to be kept as far away from
their ears as possible.
Each man was alloc!lted an interval of 22 inches in the British army and 26 inches
in the French army. The infantry was always closed up, so that the elbows of each
soldier touched those of the man beside him. The theoretical spacing allocated to each
man and the distance between the ranks were closely prescribed. The actual spacing,
of course, was left to the men in the ranks to sort out, so long as each man's elbows
touched those of the man next to him. Table I provides a quick review of some of
these theoretical spacings.
The manner in which the interval between the ranks was defined is not always
clear. Only the French Reglement de 1791 clearly states that it is measured from the
front rank's back, or the back of their packs, to the chest of the man in the rear rank.
如果携带了一把来复枪，轻步兵会携带一把与众不同的刺刀或者不携带刺刀。除了军服、武器、刺刀的细微差异之外，轻步兵从本质是受训以在散兵编队中作战的线列兵。
线列兵
为了充分了解线列兵与它的作战方式，我们有必要调查它的基础构成、行进方式、射击方法以及其他重要特征。线列兵是这些特征的总和，对于它没有特别好的理解的话，我们便不可能知晓事物的缘由。
步兵列队需要整个编队共同参与，他们排成三排。英国人排成两排，这是个例外，还有一个例外来自法国，我们将会在后面讨论它们，但值得注意的是，即便是在这两个国家，他们沿用至1815年的操典也明文规定了步兵们的队形应当由三个横排组成。在所有军队中，个子最高的士兵都会被置于第一排。但与其他大部分国家按身高从右到左的列队方式不同，英国人采用的是从两侧向中间递增的方式。身高在第二梯队的则会被安置在第三排，最矮的那些人则会被置于中间也即第二排。
这看起来似乎不合逻辑，因为应设法让矮子在高个子头上进行射击，但这并不是事实。这个时代的士兵穿极高的帽子，【第二排的士兵】从前排士兵之间的空隙处开火，而不是在他们头上开火。通过将较矮的士兵布置在个子最高的士兵之后，第二排的火枪尽可能地远离了前排士兵的耳朵。一想到火枪要在自己的耳旁击发，士兵便会在脑海里想象自己所将遭受的疼痛，这足以使之畏惧，如果要使士兵的耳朵不受到损伤，要使他们能够听得见指挥官的命令，就需要控制开火的噪音，使之尽可能远离士兵的耳朵。
在英国军队中，士兵之间相距22英寸，而在法国军队中士兵之间相距26英寸。步兵一向是紧靠在一起的，以致于士兵们肘碰肘。理论上士兵的间距和排距是受到严格规定的。当然了，实际运用中的间距和排距取决于队列中的士兵，只要士兵的肘会碰到旁人，他便会被挑出来。我们可以快速浏览表格1从而得知理论上的距离。
对于排距的定义并不总是明确的。只有法国的《Réglement de 1791》明确地规定了，排距即从前排士兵之背——亦或是从他们的背包——至后排士兵的胸的距离。
表1.队列里士兵的间距和排距
士兵间距 排距
奥地利 未知 2步（49.8英寸）
英国 22英寸 1步
法国 26英寸 13英寸
普鲁士 未知 26英寸
俄国 27英寸 14英寸
第二十三页
图1.队姿
a）正视图 b）侧视图 c）行进时的姿势 d）队列间的间距，此处没有展现列队行进的密集队列
It is unknown if this is a consistent manner of defining the interval between ranks.
No other regulation that was reviewed was so specific in defining this aspect of the
formation. Figure I provides a graphic illustration of how the ranks were formed and
demonstrates the dimensions provided in Table 1.
The company was an administrative formation within the battalion. The principal
tactical component found in the battalion was the 'division'. The division was divided
into smaller manoeuvring elements. The company was the smallest administrative
unit. It is critical that it be understood that the administrative company and the tacti-
cal division - depending on the national definition of that unit - do not have an ex-
actly analogous nature. Because of differences in organising the battalion, the division
was either the tactical equivalent of the company (Prussia and Russia) or the equiva-
lent of two companies (the rest of Europe).
Today the difference between the company and the division or peloton has ceased to
exist, but it is critical in the period 1792-1815. As a result, when tactics are discussed
the term peloton or division will be used. Though the names might change between
armies, this practice of subdividing the division into smaller elements was universal.
The ultimate unit was the fIle, which consisted of three men, one from the first rank,
one from the second rank, and one from the third rank. It was the number of files that
was used to size the next larger manoeuvring element and to control the frontages of
every formation the infantry used.
The number of files per division cannot easily be provided because the organisa-
tional strengths of the divisions varied repeatedly for these armies during the period
1792-18 IS. Every reorganisation either increased or decreased the number of files,
and a compilation of those relationships is beyond the scope of this work.
对排距的规定是否始终如一，我们不得而知。没有其他规章如此详细地规定了编队的情况。图1为我们提供了编队怎样组成编队的图例且展示了表1所提供的数据。
连队是军队里的一个管理单位。军队中首要的作战单位是“分队（division）”。分队又被分为更小的行动单位。连队是最小的管理单位。我们需理解的关键的一点是，起管理作用的连队和作战的分队—取决于国家对部队的定义—在性质上并不完全类似。因为在组织军队上有不同之处，所以分队可以等同于一个连队（普鲁士和俄罗斯），或者是等同于两个连队（欧洲的其余地方）。
今天，连队与分队或是大队（peloton）的不同之处已不复存在，但在1792年至1815年间这种差异很显著。结果是，当讨论这个时期的战术时，人们会使用大队（peloton）或者是分队（division）这类的术语。虽然它们在军队中的名称可能有异，但人们普遍将分队细分为更小的作战单位。最小的单位是列（file），由三个人组成，一个来自第一排，一个来自第二排，一个来自第三排。一定数量的列组成更大一些的行动单位，这些列也能被用以控制步兵用的每种编队的正面。
每个分队的列的数目难以知晓，因为在1792至1815年间，师的兵力数目在不断变化。每次改编要么增加了列的数目，要么减少了列的数目，编绘这些关联超出了本书的范围。
第二十四页
表2.将兵力完整的师进行拆分
奥地利人 1个分队=2个连队=4个“半连队”=8个组（Züge）
巴伐利亚人 1个分队= 2个连队（或2个“半师”）=4个组=8个小队=16个“半小队”
英国人 1个分队=2个排（连队）=4个从属分队=8个小队
法国人 1个分队=2个排（连队）=4个小队
普鲁士人 1个分队（连队）=2个大队=4个组=32个小队
俄国人 1个分队（连队）=2个排=4个“半排”=12个小队
撒克森人 1个分队=2个“半师”（2个连队）=4个大队=8个小队
The size of the sub-divisions, sections, etc., were critical. They had to be of equal
size, because if they were not the formation would be both ragged and might well not
work as desired.
All of the regulations laid down a maximum and a minimum number of fIles for
each of these manoeuvring elements. When casualties occurred, men were drawn from
the third rank and placed into the second rank to maintain the 'critical' minimum
frontage of the manoeuvring element. If casualties were high enough the third rank
would disappear completely. Some regulations even allow for the second rank to be
totally depleted and used to fill out the fIrst rank. Furthermore, if one peloton suffered
heavy casualties, men from other companies could be drawn into it to flesh it out and
maintain its frontage at the length required by regulation.
Should. casualties be high enough the division could eliminate one of its larger
manoeuvrmg elements and use the men to flesh out the remaining elements. It would
then simply operate with a smaller frontage, but the number of fIles in the sections had
to remain relatively constant. The 1804 British Manual of Platoon Exercises states:
'The companies [meaning platoons] may be equalised in point of numbers at all times
when the battalion is formed for fIeld movement and could the battalions of a line also be equalised, the greatest advantages would arise.'
下属分队、小队等军队编制的规模是明确的。它们不得不具有相同的规模，因为如果它们不这样，将会导致参差不齐和难以如愿运作的情况发生。
所有的规章都规定了机动队中的列的最大数目和最小数目。当出现伤亡时，第三排的士兵被抽调出来并被布置到第二排以维持调遣队正面【长度】的最低临界值。如果伤亡足够惨重，第三排会完全消失。一些规章甚至考虑将第二排完全抽调出来补充第一排。此外，如果一个大队伤亡惨重，其他连队的士兵会被抽调进大队中以补充大队，维持规章所要求的正面长度。
如果伤亡惨重，分队会解散它的一个大规模机动队，并以士兵补充残存部队。之后，【部队】以更小的正面规模作战，但小队中列的数目仍是恒定的。《The 1804 British Manual of Platoon Exercises states》记录道：“当军队列队行进时，连队（指排）就数目而言总是均衡的，一条战线上营的数目也是如此，这十分有益。”
图2.1791年的法国步兵大队
1=队长 2==中尉 3=少尉 4=军士长 5=军士 6=下士
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