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发表于 2007-8-13 18:03:03
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Artillery attacked by cavalry and infantry.
Most guns were captured by flank attack.
There were quite many guns captured in battles.
In 1809 at Aspern-Essling the French 24th Light's in brilliant bayonet charge overran Austrian battery. The French took 700 prisoners and recaptured the church.
In 1800 at Marengo the French 22nd Line captured several Austrian pieces near Fontanone and used them against their former owners.
In 1806 at Jena the French 16th Light (3 btns.) marched to the left towards the woods. One battalion deployed into skirmish chain while two other advanced to the right of the woods in column. While the skirmishers pushed into the wood the column past it and deployed into line within musket range of Prussian battery. They fired on the gunners and advanced to within pistol range "from there they advanced in skirmish formation and in a sharp fight captured 11 guns from the Prussians." (Nafziger - "Imperial Bayonets" 1996, p 169)
In 1809 at Aspern-Essling the French Guard infantry deployed from 3-rank deep line into a thick skirmish line and took advantage of numerous canals and ditches. They closed to the 50 Austrian guns and delivered a volley. It surprised the Austrians, they limbered up and hastily withdrew all 50 guns to a position where stood Austrian cavalry.
One of the best way to attack artillery, was to divide the attacking cavalry or infantry into three groups; one group moved in dispersed order as skirmishers, another group charged the supporting troops; and the third group served as a reserve. (If the battery was supported on flanks by cavalry or infantry, then the attackers advanced rather against the supporting troops and than against the guns. If these were defeated the guns "would either have to retreat or to be captured.")
Such formation forced the artillery to divide its fire into three different targets. If the skirmishers were of infantry they would advance up to 250-300 paces from the guns and then they would either took cover in ditches, canals, behind trees and bushes or simply lay down. The guns would fire canister but with little results. If the attackers were brave they would take advantage of the gunsmoke and time the gunners needed to load their guns and attack. Sometimes however the gunners were more determined than the attackers. In 1815 at Ligny two lines of French skirmishers attacked a Prussian battery. The guns fired canister and the skirmishers delivered a volley and then they threw themselves on the ground. The fire kept the French "glued" to the ground. When at Waterloo French skirmishers, closely followed by columns, approached the British batteries behind the sunken lane, a wave of panic began to spread among the artillerymen. Sir William Gomm, a member of Wellington's staff, saw 2 cannons being moved back in great haste, and he couldn't help noting that this withdrawal was carried out with 'considerable bustle'. But the majority of the guns were simply abandoned.
If the battery was deployed near bushes, trees, ditches, hollow ground etc. the infantry skirmishers would take cover and fire on the gunners. This method usually brought very good results and the gunners either fled or were killed. In April 1813 at Halle General Maison detached a battalion of the French 153rd Line to the Giermeritz farm, on an island formed by two branches of the Saal River. The battalion's voltigeurs took up a position where their fire began picking off the Prussian gunners serving the guns in the earthwork on the far side of the river. The 2 6pdr cannons and 1 howitzer were soon withdrawn because of the voltigeurs' well aimed fire. The French threw another company of voltigeurs (of 151st Line) up to the bridge. They took up positions where they could shower musket fire on the Prussian artillery.
British gunners attacked by French cavalry at Waterloo When attacked by cavalry the gunners either run to nearby squares of infantry or clumped behind and under their guns, carriages and wagons. Sometimes the braver ones drove the attackers back with their ramrods and handspikes, as it happened between Prussian gunners and French cavalry in 1815 at Ligny. When cavalry captured battery they tried to drag off the guns. Not always it was possible due to the absence of horses, limbers and drivers. On 8th February 1814 at Pozzolo the Austrian Savoy and Hohenlohe dragoons and the Erzherzog Karl uhlans routed the French-Italian cavalry (Perreimond's cavalry, French 1st Hussars, Italian Queen's dragoons) and captured six guns. As the Austrians tried to drag off the captured pieces, they found that the French had taken all the limbers. As a result they were able to seize just one gun as proof of their bravery. (Nafziger and Gioannini - "The Defense of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Northern Italy, 1813-1814" p 166) English officer Patterson wrote after Waterloo: "The French cavalry, having posessed themselves of the brigade of Dutch guns posted on the heights to the left and rear of the wood of Hougoumont, were galloping, sword in hand, and cutting right and left at the gunners, who took shelter beneath the guns; but in this maneuver the gallant horsemen were exposed to the fire of the Black Brunswickers, whose heads were on level with the slope of the hill, which proved so destructive to them, at the very moment when they thought themselves in full posession of their prey, that, being without means of spiking the guns, or carrying them off ... they were compelled to retire ..."
Most often the cavalry did not spike the captured guns. The reasons were:
@ - lack of tools in that moment and that place (in contrast to long lasting sieges, the cavalry had little opportunity and time to distribute the hammers and nails before battle)
@ - lack of time due to enemy's counterattack. When at Borodino the French captured several Russian guns they tried to block the touchholes of the guns with earth and sticks. The Russians counterattacked, recaptured their guns, cleared the touchholes and managed to open fire on the retreting enemy.
There were numerous cases where guns were captured, mostly by a flank attack. Only few times the battery was taken by a frontal assault. For example at Jena the French 111th Line Infantry captured a Prussian battery despite 6 volleys of canister. In 1813 at Bautzen the Wirtembergian infantry brigade closed to within 200 paces of the Prussian artillery, braving its intense fire, and with a great yell lunged forward to put the gunners to the bayonet. (Nafziger - "Lutzen and Bautzen" p 239) |
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