《Medieval Armies and Weapons in Western Europe》节译

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激战

骑士在战斗中发挥了重要的作用，并从10世纪至13世纪的大部分时间里，他们占据了霸主地位。中世纪战争的特点是带有步兵支援的骑兵间的决斗，而两军相遇全力冲锋的壮观景象很快成为中世纪时期激战的高潮。然而，中世纪的战术理念，总是非常容易引发遐想为，由骑在马背上的重装骑士一成不变地大混战或冲锋组成。这是一种过于简单的想法；：例如，由于部队参战的数量，在战斗中的机动，将领的技艺，每场激战都是各不相同。然而要理解的是，有一定数量的基本部署，仍然在整个中世纪期间保持不变 。因为骑在马上的人的冲锋只能在一片大的、平坦的、干燥的和裸露的空地上，一处合适战场—有可能是一片平原—的选择，往往是对阵前双方商定的。通过快速的行动或者伏击使敌人出乎意料当然也是有可能的。

两军都建立起自己的营地，在那里他们可以在战斗之前休息。现代物流概念和管理发展在过去的几个世纪中发展成为战争主导因素之一。它包括供应职能、运输、疏散和住院医疗，以及支撑军队在战役中的能力。而这没有或者很少存在于中世纪。

一支普通的在征途上的中世纪军队是由众多的、笨重的和不规则的车辆和推车构成，主要靠驴和牛拖拉；为了更快地运输目的同样也使用驮马。当下雨的时侯和在炎热的季节里尘土飞扬的小道，古怪的车队缓慢艰难地移动在未铺砌的道路上。推车和马车载运贵族的行李和沉重的武备。士兵们不得不带着他们的武器和自己的器具，一直走上数英里。骑兵们组成侦察队在前方、侧翼和后方警戒。

现代军队的补给供应没有退场，但在“百年”战争的开始时，一些商家们被授予委任，为部队提供补给。被称为“vitailleurs”的他们很快就以奸商和骗子而为人所知。vitailleur一词后来应用于为海上舰队负责补给的队长，并最终在波罗的海成为海盗的代名词（Vitaliebrudern或维塔利安兄弟）。从总体上看，在西罗马帝国毁灭后，后勤术已经消失。中世纪军队在战斗中的补给就是这样完全随意的。士兵不得不自谋生计，有什么吃什么。劫掠村庄和抢劫朋友或者敌人，是唯一的生存之道。

跟随在行进的军队之后的非战斗人员包括文员、鞍匠、木匠、铁匠和马医、外科医生兼理发师，以及其他为战争目的和日常社会所需的其他工匠。职业军人的妻子可能作为派得上用处的裁缝、随军商贩和洗衣妇。这类“后勤人员”包括走动的商家和贸易商还有妓女——在每只军队中的固定惯例——以及乞丐、流浪汉和贼， 他们不受刑罚浑水摸鱼。这样一支军队的行程，缺乏真实有效的凝聚力，始终是当地乡村居民的灾难，因为民间战争受害者的赔偿概念是完全不存在的。

在战前，士兵听取弥撒，两军由他们各自的神职人员祝福并祈祷胜利。随军携带圣人遗迹并不少见。从理论上讲，神职人员不得参加战斗，因为教会禁止他们洒放基督徒的鲜血。但在实际中，主教临时将他的主教法冠替换为头盔、把他的牧仗替换为骑矛则并不罕见。中世纪的思维确实是交杂物欲，甚至可以说是物欲横流的，动机并不仅是同宗教和理想主义的感情交织在一起。在战前，年轻的乡绅被晋升骑士，而领导人可能会对他的部队演说 以鼓舞士气和勇气，在这之后部队被派上战场。两军领导人在他们的军队战斗之前有可能会发生决斗。

为了展开一场战斗，一名骑士需要一些援助。不止一匹马必备，而且骑士在近战中需要帮助，使用和携带他的不断增长的阻碍诸如 他的骑矛、剑、头盔和盾。至少他要负担一面盾escuyer（古法语esquier）。也许他有一个或者更多的马夫来照料马匹；一个或者更多的军士，一名cheval（法语骑兵），轻装骑兵用以为他侦查或参与小规模战斗；以及也许有一个或多个步兵来站岗。所以单个骑士拓展为半打人——在一些情况下更多——的战斗队伍，如同一些巨大的主战坦克的成员。到10世纪，整个机构变得实在非常昂贵，而战争管理则是富裕的专业人员的业务。一名骑士和他的团队被称之为一支兰斯或一个旗队。更多的这些个单位在一起——约莫三十到四十个团体——形成一个bataille，（这个词稍后演变成battalion，营， 表示一个由连和排组成的步兵单位）。骑马的bataille形成主攻部队，同作为支援和防御部队的步兵一起。

在12世纪前，步兵部队相当小而且受鄙视。如果武装部队有弓箭手，战斗会以羽箭的初步齐射开始。小规模战斗可能在先遣骑手之间展开，同时敌对的两军机动并互相劝说对方冲锋。骑士的第一轮冲锋很少得手，而如果敌人能多地信赖于他的初步行动，那么在敌人恢复前，有效反击的机会增加。许多战斗失败是由于过于急切的骑士的冲动的开场攻击。与往常一样在战争中，取得初步成功所带来的过度自信，而这自信随后可能反被一个灾难性的敌人所趁。骑兵也可以尝试包抄敌人，而对于领导人而言将部队预备以巩固弱化的阵列，发起决定性的冲锋，或者如果要使用假装撤退，将部队设伏自然是受到欢迎的。

着甲的战斗人员的交锋在众多的决斗中迅速展开陷入迷茫的混战。当骑矛被折断，骑士使用他们的其他武器作战：剑、斧、锤和钉头锤。战场上的策略除原始外不会再有其他。制造复杂的机动和大规模调遣当然是很困难的（如果不是不可能的话）因为领导者（这人可能是国王、公爵或伯爵）处在他的部队的前方。领导人与他们一起冲锋和战斗，没有或者很少有准备好的计划，没有战场全局观，不能给出战术命令。在战斗期间，首领将纪律强加于他的年轻的且鲁莽的骑士们可能存有困难。纪律的确是中世纪军队中最弱的一点，尤其是年轻喧闹的骑士。强调个人的荣耀是如此强烈，甚至有战争经验的人往往无法有理由争论反对。出自不遵守具体命令，头脑发热骑士的个人勇气和散漫冲动有时给整个军队带来灾难。他们中的许多人并不总是理解谨慎撤退以使得重新集结部队而后再次发动成功反击的战术的必要性。他们作战，在毫无意义的情况中凭借力量和勇气战斗。他们经常督促对不利的处境或者对坚固阵地冲锋，因为他们渴望故作勇敢和光荣。骑士——整体上——是很勇敢的战士，但却是非常差的战略家。

当然，不是所有骑在马上的人都是愚蠢和自杀性的，许多人在战场上有着纪律及其重要性的认识。他们同他们的同伴们一起倚靠密集队形，用他们的盾作为掩护，然后冲锋，撤退，重组，并再次攻击，当命令这样做时。纪律的关键问题在很大程度上取决于领导者能够（或不能）将它的价值灌输给他的部队。

两队骑士冲锋群的交锋可能是欧洲战场从未见过的最令人敬畏的景象。然而即使在骑士的鼎盛时期，骑兵并不总是作为骑乘部队使用。有大量下马骑兵战斗的战例。例如，在1346年的克雷西之战中，英国骑士下马并在弓箭手的支援下步行战斗。这个战术也被伯特兰?杜?盖斯克兰在在1364年的科歇雷尔之战中采用。同样发生在1382年的罗斯贝克之战和1415年的阿金库尔之战。为了说明骑兵部队上马或者下马与否的优势，我们必须回到一个简单的解释：骑乘部队通常比徒步数英里的步兵以更好的状况抵达战场。在13世纪前的日子里，步兵的作用是普通且次要的。步兵是辅助人员。他们被负责守卫营地、马匹和运输车辆。如果投入战斗，步兵只能希望从骑兵眼皮底下劈砍战马；他们对对抗武装骑士不可抗拒的冲锋不抱希望。在各方面，骑士主宰着他的四周，随心游走，随意杀戮。步兵被高度蔑视，在当时由一种说法为“百骑胜千步”。

中世纪的交战者不是被某个民族理念或者某个爱国主义思想所推动。他们被乐趣和激情；被英勇的愿望；被保卫家庭、家族或者某人的领主的私人利益的忠诚；或者被十字军战争时期的狂热的宗教热情激发去战斗。民族主义，这种大于某人的村庄、封地、省或者区的群体归属感认知是不存在的。例如，在法国，爱国主义似乎随着女英雄圣女贞德（1412—1431）出现。。爱国主义和民族主义对于普通人是模糊和混乱的道德标准。诸如公民意识、爱国主义和为民族牺牲一类的观念，实际上只有到1789年法国大革命时才出现，并被拿破仑在1799—1815年期间充分利用。

一场战斗从不持续很久，也许几小时，大半天，或者一整天。如果 在纪律严明，团结一致地打击，骑士的冲锋能够粉碎敌人的阵列，并决定性地影响战斗结果。很大程度上取决于个人因素，如体质、无畏、勇和随冲锋后发生的短兵相接。无畏发挥了重要作用，但当寡不敌众时，好斗是不够的。虽然马上的骑士总是容易受到弓箭手的打击，并且一旦马被打翻——无论是暂时击倒、受伤或者死亡——下了马的骑士除了投降，只有不大的生存几率。逐渐地，一方或另一方占据上风。

最幸运的战败莫过于撤离到安全地带，较为不幸的则投降并被俘。骑士精神，这种荣誉感——由礼仪文学所推广——激起勇敢行为和同骑士准则理念相符的英勇仪态。但是——正如我们已经知道的——这些美德只适用与骑士，相同社交世界的战斗人员，和贵族战士，他们视对手为同行或者同袍。对于常见的人群，步兵和平民，骑士们往往表现得野蛮，没有或者很少怜悯。教会众多尝试战争人道化的行动和法令表民，处决非贵族俘虏、残杀、大规模屠杀、致残、破坏村庄、掠夺城市和强奸妇女并不是特殊的暴行。

总之，大对决——付出极为昂贵的人命代价的——是相当罕见的。中世纪的战争——在总体上——同长期以来所认为的观点相比是非常逊色的。不只有激战，它包括战斗人员数目相当有限的局部战争、有限的冲突、短暂的行动、边打边跑袭击、伏击、小规模战斗和小规模围攻。必须要记住，考虑到周期持续达千年，和平时刻和相对平静的时期是众多的。战争的频率和强度由于它们在时间和空间中变化相当大，所以是难以衡量的。中世纪的战争——如同其他地方和其他时间的其他战争——是残酷的、艰苦的、无情的和毫无意义的，欧洲遭受过许多黑暗和灾难性的时期，尤其是在9世纪、10世纪和14世纪。但是我们——亲眼目睹和经历过工业化的战斗、全民动员、全面战争、大规模灭绝、种族灭绝和核爆炸——可以想见中世纪战争可能是何等简陋和小型。整个中世纪比其他历史时期更为暴力是非常可疑的断言。等比例地，同16世纪的宗教战争期间大屠杀、路易十四时代的杀戮、拿破仑战争的残杀、美国内战的残酷以及在二十世纪上半期期间两次世界大战的两场可怕的文明社会的倒退相比，即兴的中世纪战争有多野蛮？

Pitched Battle
Knights played an important role in battle, and from
the 10th century to a large part of the 13th century, they
reigned supreme. Medieval warfare was characterized by
duels between horsemen with infantry support, and the
spectacle of two armies meeting in a full-scale charge was
soon to become the climax of pitched battles in the Middle
Ages. However, the idea of medieval tactics as consisting
of vast melees or charges by heavily armed knights,
invariably on horseback, captures the imagination all too
easily. This is an oversimplification; each pitched battle
was totally different from another by the number of forces
engaged, maneuvers during the battle, and skill of the
leaders, for example. This being understood, there were,
however, a certain number of basic dispositions that
remained the same throughout the Middle Ages. Because
the charge of mounted men was only possible on a
large, flat, dry, and bare space, the choice of a suitable
battlefield — possibly a plain — was often agreed to by
both sides before the confrontation. Surprising the enemy
by swift action or ambushing him was of course also
possible.

Both armies established their camps where they could
rest before the battle. The modern concept of logistics and
administration developed, in the last centuries, into one
of the dominant factors of warfare. It includes the functions
of supply, transport, evacuation and hospitalization,
and the capacity of supporting military forces in campaign.
None or very little of this existed in the Middle Ages.
An average medieval army on the march was composed
of numerous, ponderous, and heteroclite vehicles
and carts mainly drawn by donkeys and oxen; for quicker
haulage purposes packhorses were also used. The odd
convoy moved with slowness and difficulty on unpaved
roads which turned into quagmires when it rained and
dusty tracks in hot weather. Carts and chariots were
reserved to carry the noblemen's luggage and the heavy
war equipment. Soldiers had to walk along for miles,
escorting the long and slow column and carrying their
weapons and own implements. Cavalrymen formed
groups of scouts in the van, flank and rear guards.
Modern army supply services did not exit, but at the
beginning of the Hundred Year' War, some merchants
were commissioned to provide supplies for the troops.
Named "vitailleurs," they quickly came to light as
profiteers and swindlers. The term vitailleur was later
applied to captains charged with providing supplies for
sea fleets and eventually became a synonym of pirates in
the Baltic Sea (Vitaliebrudern or Vitalian Brothers). On
the whole, the art of logistics had disappeared after the
fall of the western Roman Empire. The supply of the
medieval army in campaign was thus completely improvised.
Soldiers had to shift for themselves and live off the
land. Marauding and pillaging the countryside, friend or
foe, was the only way to survive.

The army on the march was followed by noncombatant
personnel including clerks, saddle makers, carpenters,
blacksmiths and farriers, surgeon-barbers, and
other craftsmen needed for the purpose of war and daily
life of a community. The wives of professional soldiers
could be useful as sewers, vivandieres, and washerwomen.
This "logistical" personnel included ambulant merchants
and traders but also prostitutes—a fixed institution in
every army — as well as beggars, tramps, and thieves who
took advantage of the confusion to loot with impunity.
The passage of such an army, lacking true and effective
cohesion, was always a calamity for the local countryside
population because the notion of indemnifying civilian
victims of war was totally unknown.
Before a battle, soldiers heard mass, armies were
blessed by their respective clergymen, and prayers for victory
were said. It was not uncommon that saints' relics
were carried with the troops. In theory, clergymen were
not permitted to take part in combat as the Church forbade
them to shed the blood of Christians. But in practice,
it was not uncommon to see a bishop temporarily
exchanging his miter for a helmet and his crook for a
lance. The mentality of the Middle Ages was indeed complex
as material, even materialistic, motives were not
infrequently interwoven with religious and idealistic feelings.
Before a battle, young squires were knighted, and
the leader might speak to his troops to boost morale and
courage after which the forces were deployed on the battlefield.
It could occur that two leaders would fight in a
duel before their troops.
For an extended campaign, a knight needed some
assistance. More than one horse was necessary, and the
knight needed help in manipulating and carrying his growing number of impediments such as his lance, sword,
helmet, and shield. At the very least he needed a shield
bearer, the escuyer (esquire). Probably he also had one or
more grooms for the horses; one or more sergeants a
cheval, lightly armored horseman
to scout and skirmish for him; and
perhaps one or more foot soldiers
to stand guard. So the lone knight
expanded to a fighting team of
half a dozen men — in some case
more — like the crew of some enormous
battle tank. By the 10th century,
the whole apparatus became
very expensive indeed, and the
management of war was a business
for wealthy specialists. A knight
with his team was called a lance or
a banner. More of these units
together — say about thirty to forty
groups—formed a bataille (this
term later became battalion, indicating
an infantry unit composed
of companies and platoons). The
mounted batailles formed the main
attacking force with infantry as
supporting and defensive troops.
Before the 12th century, the
infantry force was rather small and
despised. If the armed force had
archers, the battle would commence
with a preliminary volley
of arrows. Skirmishes could be
launched between outriders, while
the opposing forces maneuvered
and each tried to persuade the other
side to charge. A first charge of
knights rarely succeeded, and if
the enemy could be persuaded to
commit himself too heavily to his
initial effort, the chances of an
effective counterstroke before he
could recover were increased. Many
battles were lost by an impulsive
opening attack by over-eager
knights. As always in warfare, an
initial success brought overconfidence,
and it could be followed
by a disastrous enemy
counter-reaction. The mounted
men could also try to outflank their
enemy, and it was naturally desirable
for the leaders to hold troops
in reserve to reinforce the weakening
ranks, to launch a decisive charge, or to place a force
in ambush if a feign retreat were to be used.
The clash of the charging armored combatants
rapidly developed in numerous duels into a confused
melee. When lances were broken, knights fought with
their other weapons: sword, axe, hammer, and mace. Tactics
on the battlefield could not be other than primitive.
It was of course difficult (if not impossible) to make complicated
maneuvers and large movements as the leader
(who might be the king, duke, or count himself) was at
the head of his troops. Charging and fighting with them,
the leader had no or little prepared plans, no general view
over the battlefield and could not give tactical orders.
During the battle the chief probably had difficulty imposing
discipline on his young and foolhardy knights. Discipline
was indeed the weakest point of the medieval
army, especially of the young and boisterous knights. The
emphasis on individual glory was so strong that even
experienced men of war were often unable to argue reasonably
against it. Personal courage and undisciplined
impetuousness sometimes brought disaster on an entire
army by hot-headed knights disobeying specific orders.
Many of them did not always understand the tactical
necessity of a cautious retreat that allowed to regroup
forces and relaunch a successful counterattack. Instead,
they fought on and on with energy and courage in pointless
situations. They often urged charges against unfavorable
odds or against strong positions because they were
eager for bravado and glory. Knights—on the whole —
were very courageous soldiers but very poor strategists.
Of course not all mounted men were stupid and suicidal,
many had an idea of discipline and of its importance
on the battlefield. They stayed in close formation
with their companions, using their shields as cover, then
charged, retreated, regrouped, and re-attacked when
ordered to do so. The crucial problem of discipline
depended largely on the leader who could (or could not)
instill its value to his troops.
The clash of two charging bodies of knights was
probably the most awe-inspiring sight the battlefields of
Europe had ever seen. However, even in the heyday of the
knight, cavalrymen were not always used as mounted
troops. There are numerous examples of battles fought
by dismounted cavalry. For example, during the battle of
Crecy in 1346, the English knights dismounted and fought
on foot with the support of archers. This tactics was also
employed by Bertrand du Guesclin at the battle of
Cocherel in 1364. The same happened at the battles of
Roosebecke in 1382 and Agincourt in 1415. To explain the
superiority of cavalry forces whether mounted or dismounted,
we must return to a simple explanation:
mounted troops usually arrived in better condition on
the battlefield than infantrymen who had walked for
miles. The role of infantry during those days before the
13th century was modest and secondary. Infantrymen
were auxiliaries. They were charged to guard the camp,
horses, and transport vehicles. If thrown into the battle,
foot soldiers could only hope to cut the horse from under
the knight; they had no hope of standing against the irresistible
charge of armored knights. In every way the
knight dominated his surroundings, roaming where he
liked, and killing when he felt inclined. Foot soldiers were
highly despised, and a saying of the time was that a "hundred
horsemen are worth a thousand footmen."
Medieval combatants were not spurred by a national
idea or a patriotic ideal. They were motivated to fight by
fun and passion; by the desire of prowess; by loyalty to
defend the private interests of family, clan, or one's lord;
or by fanatical religious zeal during the Crusades. Nationalism,
that is, the feeling of belonging to a community
larger than one's village, fief, province, or region, was
unknown. In France, for example, patriotism seemed to
appear with the heroine Jeanne d'Arc (1412-1431). Patriotism
and nationalism were vague and confusing principles
for the common man. Such notions as citizenship,
patriotism, and sacrifice for the nation actually arose only
by the time of the French Revolution in 1789 and were
fully exploited by Napoleon in the period 1799-1815.
A battle never lasted for very long, perhaps a few
hours, a part of a day, or a whole day. If delivered in a
disciplined, united manner, the knights' charge could
shatter the enemy ranks and have a decisive effect on the
outcome of the battle. Much depended on individual factors,
such as physical fitness, audacity, and bravery, on
the hand-to-hand fighting following the charge. Prowess
played a central role, but pugnacity was not enough when
outnumbered. Mounted knights were always vulnerable
to archers though, and once the horse had been felled —
either temporarily bowled over, injured, or killed —the
unhorsed knight had small chance of surviving except
through surrender. Gradually one side or the other took
the upper hand.
The luckiest of the defeated withdrew to safety, the
less fortunate surrendered and were taken prisoner.
Chivalrous behavior, the sense of honor — popularized by
the literature of courtesy — provoked acts of bravery and
gestures of gallantry in conformity with the ideal of the
knightly code. But —as we already know —these virtues
only applied to the knights, combatants of the same social
world, and noble warriors who considered the opponent
as a colleague or a brother-in-arms. Against common
people, foot soldiers, and civilians, knights often behaved
with savagery and showed no or little mercy. The numerous
acts and laws of the Church that tried to humanize
war showed that the execution of non-noble prisoners, carnages,
massacres, mutilation, devastation of villages, pillage
of cities, and rape of women were not exceptional
atrocities.
In conclusion, large encounters—costly in human
lives— were rather rare. Warfare in the Middle Ages was—
on the whole — much less spectacular than it has been
long thought. More than pitched battles, it consisted of
local wars, limited conflicts, short operations, hit-andrun
raids, ambushes, skirmishes, and small-scale sieges
with a rather limited number of combatants. It must be
kept in mind that the considered period lasted for a thousand
years, and accordingly, moments of peace and relative
quiet periods were numerous. Frequency and
intensity of war are difficult to measure as they varied
considerably in time and space. Medieval wars— as other
wars elsewhere and in other times—were cruel, hard,
ruthless, and pointless, Europe suffered many dark and
disastrous periods, notably in the 9th, 10th, and 14th centuries.
But we —who have witnessed and experienced
industrial conflict, general mobilization, total war, mass
extermination, genocide, and nuclear fire—can easily
imagine how rudimentary and small-scale medieval warfare
might have been. It is very questionable to assert that
the Middle Ages on the whole was more violent than any
other period of history. Proportionally, how barbarous
was improvised medieval warfare compared to the massacres
during the wars of religion in the 16th century, the
killings of the time of Louis XIV, the Napoleonic
butcheries, the harshness of the American Civil War, and
the two horrifying recoils of civilization during the two
World Wars in the first half of the 20th century?