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发表于 2014-11-10 17:45:48
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楼上是收复土伦的作战计划,如果楼主要的是进军皮埃蒙特的计划的话,大概可能是这个。这是他在热月政变前担任意大利军团炮兵司令,参加奥内里亚战役前后的一些情况,这里面提到了他有提出过两个作战方案,不过没找到他的计划原件。时间是1794年,春季战役。 以下内容节选自钱德勒的《拿破仑战争》
He decided that the best course to pursue would be a main drive along the coast road to capture Oneglia and thus reopen the sea link with Genoa, associating this move with an attack into the mountains between the Roya and Nervia river valleys toward Mount Tanardo, and thence the town of Ormea and the line of the River Tanaro, supported by a further feint attack toward the fortress of Saorgio. Such moves should achieve three things: first, ease the coast trade situation as already mentioned; secondly, turn the strategic flank of the Piedmontese army and compel it to abandon its positions and retire; and thirdly, leave the Army of Italy at the close of the campaign in the useful position of controlling two vital passes on the edge of the mountains, ready for a further advance into the fertile plains of Piedmont. This plan was soon accepted, and Dumerbion raised no objections to having 20,000 men withdrawn from his 43,000-strong field army to form a striking force, nor to their subdivision into three attacking formations and a reserve.
Despite initial delays caused by heavy snowfalls, the offensive eventually went according to plan. On April 16, General Massena,* entrusted with two brigades for the inland attack, swept past Monte Tanardo and on to Ormea without encountering serious opposition. On learning that the Piedmontese were still lingering around Saorgio, he then swung rapidly westward, cut their line of retreat and compelled them to surrender to Dumerbion, who pushed up the main Nice road with the remainder of his army. On the coastal sector, meanwhile, the attack was proceeding equally successfully. Not only Oneglia but also Albenga and Loano beyond fell to the French in quick succession, and by early May the Army of Italy was firmly planted along the watershed of the Maritime Alps with the important Col de l’Argentières, Tende and St. Bernardo passes under their control. Once again, by means of a correct appreciation, Buonaparte had devised an effective plan of operations solving the immediate strategic problem. Many features of the campaign had been borrowed directly from Bourcet’s Princtpes de la Guerre des Montagues, a copy of which he probably studied some years previously at Auxonne or Pommiers as the protégé of the Baron du Teil. Nevertheless, it was an encouraging beginning; and many features of future campaigns—the use of diversions, the division of the army into petits pacquets (apparently dispersed but in fact carefully placed within supporting distance of one another) and the use of a centrally placed reserve—spring immediately to mind.
Through the medium of the Députés, Brigadier General Buonaparte produced a second plan of operations without delay. It was a plan designed to exploit the initial success and break through the 45,000-strong Piedmontese army in order to penetrate into the plain of Mondovi and thus relieve the critical shortage of supplies being suffered by the Army of Italy. In some ways this plan was rather more ambitious; it called for closely concerted action between the Army of Italy and the neighboring Army of the Alps; the immediate target was to be the area known as “the Barricades” not far above the Col de l’Argentières. While the two French armies moved along their respective lines of operations to a general rendezvous near the fortress of Coni, a further force would sweep down into the plains from the neighborhood of the distant Col di Tende and thus complete the disruption of the enemy army. This plan was duly adopted by the Députés and sent on to Paris for final approval on May 21. After some small queries, Carnot and the Committee of Public Safety approved the plan, and on June 5 the first phase was put into execution. |
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