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发表于 2010-11-12 19:04:27
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本帖最后由 iron duke 于 2010-11-12 20:08 编辑
战略机动要看条件。在半岛,威灵顿的兵没后勤情况下,野战生存能力比法军差。与此类同,机动能力也比法军差。相反,阵地战却强于法军。当然要用长处。没充足条件打不起的战术,当然威灵顿也不会那么在行。
但是要是有幸换到指挥几年1805的法军,可能是另一情况了。
对了,圭达的书有没有威灵顿的初阵坎诺格尔,那次也是连续的机动,把“两个世界之王”逼入绝境。
再者,1805和1809的冒险,应该是指奥斯特利茨和阿斯佩恩-埃斯灵吧,乌尔姆冒多大险了?
“拿破仑把我们给骗了”好象解释过。就里士满公爵一个旁证,里士满没形容表情,倒是里士满公爵接着就是说,威灵顿指向地图:“如果不能在这里阻击他,我们就在这儿。”前一个指的四臂村,后一个指滑铁卢。按里士满公爵长女回忆,威灵顿送走奥兰治亲王传令后,夜宵时表情很轻松。
Captain Bowles:
(Wellington) whispered to ask the Duke of Richmond if he had a good map. The Duke of Richmond said he had, and took Wellington into his dressing-room. Wellington shut the door and said, "Napoleon has humbugged me, by God; he has gained twenty-four hours' march on me. … I have ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre Bras; but we shall not stop him there, and if so I must fight him there" (passing his thumb-nail over the position of Waterloo). The conversation was repeated to me by the Duke of Richmond two minutes after it occurred. |
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