本帖最后由 王法拉 于 2013-9-23 15:42 编辑
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Meantime, on the Russian right flank, the soldiers of the 1st Jäger Regiment were still guarding the banks of the Kolocha. As Petrov recalled: During the night of 27 August [8 September], the patrols dispatched from our regiment reported every hour that the French advance posts were withdrawal further and further. Finally, around the midnight, our patrol officer, returning from his watch, reported to the regimental commander that the enemy was not detected in the area between Rayevsky’s Battery and the Stonets Redoubt and to the right to the Kolocha river. To gather more intelligence and explain the whereabouts of our enemy, one NCO and ten Jägers were ordered to take off their boots, swim across the Kolocha, and determine if the French were still in the village of Borodino. The patrol returned in an hour reporting that the enemy was not in Borodino but on the hill behind the village on the right bank of the Voina, where a thick chain of their cavalry was noticed. Our commander [Karpenko], an experienced staff officer with advance post service in various campaigns, quickly realized the importance of this news and sent his regimental adjutant to apprise Barclay de Tolly. In the meantime, [Karpenko] assumed that the next day would certainly start with an order to attack and instructed his company commanders to increase the number of cartridges issued. After this, the troops were allowed to place their weapons in trestles [‘na kozly’] and rest; the men lay down on the ground and had a quiet sleep on the steep bank of the Kolocha […] Around 5am on 27 August, we dispatched a company of artisans to gather woods from bivouacs to the bank of the Kolocha, where a floating bridge was constructed in order to facilitate the crossing to the village of Borodino as everyone eagerly awaited the order to attack. Instead, we are ordered to remove our advance posts and proceed to Mozhaisk following the army as it began retreating to Moscow; the Cossacks were told to observe the enemy whose cavalry pickets could be seen on the position that the enemy occupied on 25 August [6 September].519
与此同时,处于俄军右翼的 第1猎兵团仍然在警戒Kolocha河岸。Petrov回忆道:在8月27号日晚上(从下文看是凌晨,此为俄历,公历为9月8日),我们团派出的斥候回报说,法军的前沿部队正在不断后退。最后,我们的侦察军官在午夜时分回报团部,说Rayevsky炮垒、Stonets多面堡、Kolocha河右岸之间的区域已无敌踪。为了进一步了解敌情,我们派出了一位军士带着十名猎兵游过了Kolocha河,看看法军是否还呆在博罗季诺村里。一小时后他们回报说村中已无法军,但是村后的小山和Voina河右岸发现了大批敌人骑兵。 我们的指挥Karpenko是个有经验的参谋军官,经历过多次战斗,他马上意识到这个情报的重要性并让副官去向巴克莱汇报。同时,Karpenko也想到明天可能会接到进攻命令,为此他命令手下多储备弹药以备不时之需。忙完这些,队伍得到了休息,人们架好武器,在Kolocha陡峭河岸附近静静地入眠。大概在8月27号上午五点(俄历),我们派工程部队在Kolocha河边收集木料,一座浮桥也同时搭建好,人人都在渴望着收复博罗季诺的进攻命令。可是我们却接到了跟随部队后撤到Mozhaisk(然后是莫斯科)的指示;哥萨克则负责监视敌军骑兵(敌人位于俄历8月25号,即公历9月6号他们夺取的阵地上)。
Late that evening, Kutuzov returned to his headquarters at Tatarinovo, where he convened a council of war to decide what to do next. According to Bennigsen, ‘That evening we were still not aware of the huge losses we had suffered during the day. We therefore considered, for a while, retaking our central battery during the night and continuing the battle on the morrow.’520 Toll and his staff officers were instructed to inspect the army and their reports began arriving around 11pm. They brought the frightening news of Russian casualties and the full picture of the Army’s condition was gradually revealed. Tens of thousands were killed, wounded and missing, entire regiments destroyed and divisions reduced to hundreds. Kutuzov still had six regiments (four Jäger units and two Life Guard Semeyonovskii and Prebrazhenskii Regiments) remaining in reserve but they were certainly insufficient to shore up the Russian positions. After a discussion with his generals, Kutuzov, realizing the futility of remaining on the battlefield, ordered a retreat to a new position, several miles away, near Mozhaisk. The Russian Army was divided into three columns led by Dokhturov, Miloradovich and Platov, with a fourth consisting of artillery. Barclay de Tolly was initially unaware of these arrangements and learned about it only after midnight.
当晚库图佐夫返回了位于Tatarinovo的指挥部并召开了下一步作战会议。本尼格森提到,当时他们并没有意识到俄军在日间的损失是如此惨重,军官们仍然计划着夜袭夺回中央炮垒,明天继续和法军较量。Toll和手下的参谋前去检查部队,他们在晚上11点左右返回,并带来了俄军可怕的伤亡统计与逐渐明晰的部队现状。已有上万人死伤、失踪,团级建制被打掉,师级单位只剩下几百人的情况比比皆是。库图佐夫手里还有六个团的预备队(四个猎兵团、近卫Semeyonovskii 团、近卫 Prebrazhenskii团),但这些部队不足以补上战线。在和将军们商讨后,库图佐夫意识到留在战场上已经毫无意义,是时候撤退了。俄军后撤了数英里,临近了Mozhaisk。他们分为三个集团,分别由Dokhturov,、Miloradovich 和 Platov指挥,炮兵则作为第四部分单独处理。巴克莱起初并没有察觉到新的部署,直到午夜过后才反应过来。
The Russian headquarters was, meantime, discussing the direction of further retreat. Should it be to Moscow? Or maybe to Vereya or Borisov, which might compel Napoleon to follow the Russian Army towards Kaluga instead of advancing to Moscow? Kutuzov argued that the Army should withdraw along the Moscow Road, and so it did.
俄军司令部此时正在讨论下一步撤退的路线。莫斯科? Vereya?还是Borisov?后者可能会把法军吸引到Kaluga使莫斯科逃过一劫。库图佐夫坚持让俄军沿着莫斯科大道撤退,而他的确这样做了。
Kutuzov knew that he was now on dangerous ground. This very action – a reprehensible retreat – had brought down his predecessor just ten days ago, and Kutuzov was certainly not willing to share Barclay’s fate. So he carefully calculated his next steps. A shrewd propagandist, he turned to preparing the Russian public for news of another retreat. The fact that Napoleon had ordered his troops to pull back to their original positions played into Kutuzov’s hands, since he could foster the illusion that the Russians had really won the day and remained in firm control of the battlefield. The battle was hardly over when one of the first letters was sent to Rostopchin, Governor of Moscow:
库图佐夫意识到现在自身难保,但也并不打算走前任的旧路(十天前巴克莱正是因为实施了“明令禁止”的撤退而被解职)。他为自己的后路精心谋划了一番。深谙此道的库图佐夫把宣传的重点放在了另一场撤退上——对法军奉拿破仑令撤回出发点进行包装,以此来让国人产生俄军打了胜仗且牢固地占领着阵地的错觉。在他写下给莫斯科地方长官Rostopchin信的第一个字母时,这场战役的结果就已经被颠倒了。
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