knightf6 发表于 2015-7-19 18:52 
我记得一战的时候，重机枪还有这种间接射击战术，用于预设阵地防御，事先测定好杀伤区域，似乎能打到2500米
Indirect fire was used as often as possible. Known communication trench positions, tracks and other targets that were out of direct view were plotted and came under bursts of machine gun fire in the hope of causing losses.
Whitehead, Ralph J. (2012-08-30). The Other Side of the Wire Volume 1: With the German XIV Reserve Corps on the Somme, September 1914-June 1916 (Kindle Locations 8415-8417). Casemate Publishers. Kindle Edition.
Here the Germans constructed a triangular – shaped field fortification called the Nordwerk. (4) Machine guns were established here and played an important role in providing overhead fire during the fight for Ovillers, particularly on 1 July 1916, until it, too, was outflanked and had to be abandoned.
Sheldon, Jack (2006-09-15). Germans at Thiepval (Battleground Somme) (Kindle Locations 1437-1439). Pen & Sword Books. Kindle Edition.
Now we have to send a runner to the Battalion Headquarters in Luisenhof 15, to brief them and request that they bring down overhead machine gun fire to support us as soon as they see our red signal flares.
Sheldon, Jack (2007-03-28). German Army on the Somme 1914-1916 (Kindle Locations 7441-7442). Casemate Publishing. Kindle Edition.
英军视角的综述
New methods of fire On a tactical level, the most important effect of the creation of the MGC was the gradual adoption of new methods offire, which took advantage of the unique characteristics of machine gun fire. The curved trajectory followed by the bullets, and the precision and predictability which was afforded by the use of a irm mount, permitted machine guns to conduct two types of long-range fire that were denied to other small arms. First, they were capable of being fired over the heads of friendly troops. Naturally this had long been undertaken where guns could be fired at, or from, some topographical eminence. It had been done in the Russo-Japanese War and the British had used the same technique even earlier, on the North West Frontier of India. However, the natural trajectory of bullets, coupled with the fact that the elevation of the machine gun could be precisely set and controlled, enabled overhead fire to be conducted on completely lat terrain. The range would be taken, and mathematical calculations made to work out the minimum elevation setting commensurate with the safety of intervening friendly troops. The elevation was then set by placing a clinometer on the body of the gun. It was vitally important that guns firing overhead were irmly mounted, and that there was no chance of the tripod sinking into the ground, even fractionally. Barrels that had fired more than 12,000 (or, for preference, 8,000) rounds were not used in guns firing overhead. Wooden stakes or cross-bars might be used to prevent over-zealous gunners from traversing, elevating or depressing their weapon outside safe parameters. Later, special stops, fulilling the same function, were extemporized for the tripod. The workshops of Second Army are recorded as producing quantities of these in the spring of 1917. Obviously, firing from the lank would usually obviate the need for these elaborate procedures, as well as subjecting the enemy to enfilade fire. However, the trench lines of the Western Front seldom offered the opportunity to take up flanking positions – at least until they were broken into in the course of attacks – so overhead fire became a much-used technique. The Guards Division made a notable early use of it at the Battle of Loos, against Hill 70.
Cornish, Paul (2012-07-23). Machine-Guns and the Great War (Kindle Locations 1472-1488). Casemate Academic. Kindle Edition.
The second important new method of exploiting the fire-characteristics of machine guns was the use of indirect fire – i.e. the use of machine guns as small artillery pieces, engaging targets that were not visible to the gunners. The theory behind this technique had long been understood. At the instigation of Lieutenant Parker, the US Army had conducted experiments with it (albeit unsuccessfully) as early as 1908. More sustained research, and the mathematical work required to provide a reliable basis for the conduct of such fire, was carried out by a group of British enthusiasts at the Hythe musketry school. However, it was 1915 before such fire was successfully carried out in the field. Captain Wright dates its adoption for general use to the winter of 1915– 16, calling it the ‘type of fire. long advocated by machine-gun experts, ‘‘ cranks’’ to their enemies, ‘‘ enthusiasts’’ to their friends’. To conduct such fire the proposed target would be located on a map, and the position of the machine gun relative to it would be determined with ruler and protractor. It is, of course, no accident that the first use of this technique in the field coincided with the production of accurate maps of the Front. 11 Calculations would be made to determine the gun’s potential cone of fire and the trajectory of its bullets (an important consideration if firing over the head of friendly troops). A clinometer, combined with the graduated elevation dial itted to the tripod, would be employed to set the gun to the correct elevation (the dial was replaced by a simpler and more intuitive wheel in 1918). From 1915 onwards, the tripod was also itted with a direction dial at the base of the crosshead. As per overhead fire, it was necessary to ensure that the gun was irmly emplaced (generally by placing sandbags on the tripod legs) and unable to sink into the ground. Aiming posts would be driven into the ground, enabling the gunner to change swiftly between different pre-selected target areas (for night shooting, shaded lamps might be employed to provide aiming marks). Such changes would be made either in conformity with a timetable, or in response to prearranged SOS signals from the infantry (the standard SOS signal at this time was a red lare). Initially the effectiveness of such fire was wholly reliant upon the expertise and dedication of the officer responsible for setting up the guns. By 1917 however, the training centre at Grantham had produced specialized graphs and slide-rules for use in setting up indirect fire, as the technique had, by this time become central to the tactics of the MGC. Austro-Hungarian machine-gunners were also versed in the techniques of indirect and overhead fire – possibly this was the fruit of their early experimentation at Bruck. It was to remain enshrined in their tactical instructions until 1918, although Austrian machine gun officers captured by the British in Italy asserted that, although they had been trained in these techniques, none, by this stage of the war, were using them in the field. Indirect fire was used to harass the enemy, and to deny him safe access to areas of ‘dead ground’. It was not introduced without a certain amount of controversy. Baker-Carr himself was not enamoured of the tactic. While he reigned supreme at the BEF Machine Gun School, the technique was recommended for searching roads and approaches by night ‘a most eficient and disconcerting form of ‘‘ Hate’’ if properly employed and regarded, mainly, as a side show’, but he disagreed with commanders who had machine guns ‘diverted from their proper uses and converted into “Pocket Howitzers’’’. Captain Dunn was moved to complain that ‘The command and position of these weapons had been removed yet farther from the front; less and less were they available for direct and opportune fire, and more were they practised on hypothetical targets on the map; it was not unknown in those days for hundredweights of lead to be buried in some intervening bank or elevation.’ Proponents of indirect fire were nevertheless bolstered in their enthusiasm for it by three factors. First, the fact the small arms ammunition was relatively cheap, and available in huge quantities. Secondly, work had to be found for the machine guns which found front-line positions increasingly untenable due to the ever-increasing weight of artillery and mortar fire that they attracted. Thirdly they quoted the statements of German prisoners who had endured such fire. Various limitations on the effectiveness of indirect fire are scrupulously noted in a British machine gun training pamphlet of May 1917, but ‘In spite of these limitations, indirect fire, according to information of prisoners and deserters, has caused a considerable amount of moral and material effect 12 on the enemy.’ Ernst Jünger, in his famous memoir Storm of Steel recalled being on the receiving end of indirect harassing fire on the Somme: ‘We were especially irritated by one machine-gunner who sprayed his bullets at such an angle that they came down vertically, with acceleration produced by sheer gravity. There was absolutely no point in trying to duck behind walls.’ 13 His shaky grasp of ballistics does not conceal his dislike of the sensation.
Cornish, Paul (2012-07-23). Machine-Guns and the Great War (Kindle Locations 1512-1549). Casemate Academic. Kindle Edition. |
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发表于 2015-7-18 22:02:56
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发表于 2015-7-18 22:28:09
