本帖最后由 王法拉 于 2013-8-29 14:22 编辑
153页-154页相关内容
Among those praising the raid, Friedrich von Schubert went as far as to claim that the manoeuvre 'produced tremendous results and added certain indecision to enemy attacks. Napoleon's own tent was quickly removed and his Guard was organized into square. The Kolotsk Monastery, where the main [French] hospital and infirmary was established, was taken over by panic.' On the opposite side, Clausewitz, as we have seen, was very critical of the entire venture.Many senior Russian officers believed the raid had the potential for tremendous success but was mishandled. They shared Clausewitz's and Lowenstern's accusations against Uvarov for sluggish performance and failure to take full advantage of the manoeuvre. Barclay de Tolly believed that: 'if this attack were carried out with greater firmness and not limited to only wearing out the enemy, it would have had brilliant consequences'. Nikolai Muravyev was certain that, if well executed, this 'surprise attack could have decided the battle outcome to our favour' and a similar opinion was voiced by Norov, among others. Furthermore, Golitsyn, who served as ordinance officer to Kutuzov, recalled that Kutuzov coldly greeted Uvarov upon his return from the raid and, hearing his report, told him: 'I know everything and may God forgive you for it!'"^^"^ The fact that Platov and Uvarov were the only generals not nominated for rewards after the battle speaks volumes about the Commander-in-Chief's dissatisfaction with their actions. In December 1812, Kutuzov even wrote to Alexander, stating that he could not recommend Uvarov for any rewards, since he failed to carry out the raid successfully. As for Platov and his Cossacks, Kutuzov told the Emperor that 'they did not fight that day as such'.
根据那些袭击的报告,Friedrich von Schubert宣称这次行动产生了惊人的效果并且让敌人的攻击更加谨慎犹豫。拿破仑自己的军帐立刻被移到了近卫军方阵里。法军的主要医疗基地 Kolotsk Monastery 也已经被恐慌所笼罩。在另一方面,就像我们看到的那样,克劳塞维茨对这次冒险指责颇多。许多俄国高级军官都认为这次突击本来可以取得巨大的成功,仅仅是没有实施好而已。他们用克劳塞维茨和Lowenstern的指责来反驳Uvarov的消极表现,认为这样丧失了进一步发展胜利的机会。巴克莱相信:“如果这次进攻由我们的主力来发起,而不仅仅作为牵制疲惫敌军之举,那我们将会取得伟大的胜利”。 Nikolai Muravyev坚信如果这次突击能得到良好的执行,那将会把胜利的天平倾向俄军,Norov和其他人也持同样的观点。此外,当时担任库图佐夫传令官的Golitsyn回忆道库图佐夫冷漠地迎接了撤出战场的Uvarov并听取了他的报告,他对Uvarov说:“我知道所有的事,但愿上帝会饶恕你!”事实上,只有Platov 和Uvarov没有在战斗结束后得到嘉奖,因为指挥部并不满意他们在战斗中的表现。在1812年12月,库图佐夫在给Alexander的信中提道,因为Uvarov的失败突击,他不会给他任何嘉奖。至于Platov和他的哥萨克,库图佐夫告诉沙皇“他们那天几乎没有战斗”。
A gallant officer, Uvarov saw his reputation somewhat tarnished at Borodino. Nevertheless, he served with distinction in the 1813-14 campaigns and was promoted to the rank of general for his actions at Leipzig. Platov's case is interesting because participants criticized him for failing to break through to Napoleon's baggage train, which would have had a major impact on the course of the battle. The Ataman had already established himself as a capable leader of Cossacks, but was also known for arrogance, a tendency to bicker with other generals, and a fondness for alcohol. A. Muravyev noted that one of the reasons for Platov's poor performance at Borodino was his hatred of Barclay de Tolly, to whom he was formally subordinated. Yet, other participants reveal that there was also one more, often overlooked, factor. Nikolai Muravyev blamed the failure of the raid on the inept orders and intoxicated condition of Count Platov [...] who was drunk that day [...] [and] Kutuzov refused to give him overall command [of the raid]; the abilities of Uvarov, who was [the] next senior officer after Platov, were mediocre and well known to everyone ...
Uvarov自认他勇敢的名声在博罗季诺受到了污损。然而他继续挂着奖章活跃在1813-1814年的战役中,并因在莱比锡的战功而得到晋升。Platov的情况很有意思,因为参战者认为他没有完成切断拿破仑补给线这一至关重要的任务。Platov早已在哥萨克中树立了领袖地位,但同时也因傲慢、与别的将领争吵以及嗜酒著称。A. Muravyev注解道,Platov在博罗季诺的拙劣表现与他对前上级巴克莱的憎恨不无关系。但是参战者们揭示了另一个常被人忽视的原因。Nikolai Muravyev将突击失败的原因归责于命令的拙劣和Platov的醉酒,而且库图佐夫并没有赋予他全局指挥的权力;而他的行动副手Uvarov,则是人所共知的能力平庸。
Similar testimony can be found in the personal journal of Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, who recorded that Platov was 'in a drunken stupor [...] which, among other things, made Kutuzov to tell me [...] that this was the first time he had seen a full general dead drunk in the midst of a decisive battle.
类似的证据可以在Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky的个人日记里找到,他把Platov记录为“状态昏昏沉沉,如同喝醉一般”,通过别的事情,库图佐夫告诉还告诉Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky ,这是他第一次见到一个上将在决战的时候还喝得烂醉。
It was natural, then, that when the first histories of the battle were written attempts were made to gloss over these awkward and unpleasant incidents' Historians and some participants tried to suppress or falsify the events of the Platov-Uvarov raid. Thus, Liprandi argued that Uvarov retreated, not because he could not break through the French squares, but because 'he was twice ordered to retreat' by Kutuzov, who was too cautious to continue this attack. Justifying Platov's actions, he argued that the Ataman purposely kept his troops in the bushes because he wanted to keep Napoleon believing that the Cossacks were supported by infantry (hiding in shrubs) thus forcing him to divert more forces to the left flank. Liprandi was supported in his effort by Bolgovsky, who also suggested that some Cossacks dismounted, acting as infantry in order to deceive Napoleon. Bolgovsky believed that
had Platov acted strictly in compliance with the orders he received [...] the defeat of our army would have been imminent, since while he remained with his men in the defile, he continued to threaten the enemy; had he attacked with his inferior forces, the threat would have disappeared at once.'
自然的,描述这场战役的第一批史料不遗余力地为这些怯懦和不光彩的事迹掩饰。某些参与者试图尘封、篡改Platov-Uvarov突击的真相。因此,Liprandi争论道,Uvarov之所以撤退,并不是他无力击溃法军方阵,而是他两次被谨慎的库图佐夫命令后撤。对于Platov的行动,他的解释是为了让拿破仑相信这次骑兵突击有步兵的支持,从而分散法军兵力支援左翼,故意让他的部队待在林木里。Liprandi的努力被Bolgovsky所证实,后者曾建议部分哥萨克下马伪装成伴随步兵来迷惑拿破仑。Bolgovsky相信Platov完全按照命令实施了行动。俄军的胜利一度唾手可得,当他让部下在隘路上前进时,这些骑兵一直对敌人保持着威胁;如果他把这不算强大的力量投入进攻,那这种威胁马上就烟消云散了。
Bolgovsky was the first to provide a specific number of troops (23 000) that Napoleon allegedly had to divert to reinforce Eugene. Later, Soviet historians came up with the even higher number of 28,000 men. Neither calculation had any factual basis, but these figures were utilized by historians to portray the raid in a favourable light.
Bolgovsky起初认为拿破仑派出23000人增援欧仁。后来的苏联史学家把这个数字提升到了28000。尽管这个计算没有任何事实依据,但这些数字被史学家用来描述这次充满希望的突击。 |