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[原创] 拿破仑的最后一战滑铁卢战役总结与研究

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 楼主| 发表于 2018-12-30 08:20:24 | 显示全部楼层
iron duke 发表于 2018-12-29 17:34
而且,哪那么多“史学界公认”了,奈伊在四臂村兵到达的全过程可参考这个 https://www.waterloo-campaign.n ...

“内伊在滑铁卢战役中的表现是灾难性的这是史学界的公认“我不认为这句话有什么错,至少是论述滑铁卢战役的多数严肃著作观点,我查阅的滑铁卢战役的著作有几十种,其中大多数的观点都是这么认为,我只是把这种观点贴出来而已。同意不同意是你的事。如果只是在网络上找论坛的帖子来反驳,我也可以花时间找到很多与你贴的相反的论据,这么争下去根本没有意义。

我参考的书目大多是最近几年出版的关于滑铁卢战役的书籍,其中多数是英文书籍。因为我发现英国人对滑铁卢战役的研究热情高到令人惊讶,几乎每年都会有数本关于滑铁卢相关的作品出版,最近几年的作品相对来说更有参考价值,因为这些最新的研究结合了前人的研究成果,并且包括了一些近几年发现的最新资料,应该更有学术价值。

滑铁卢战役本来就有很多种说法和谜团,这也是它的魅力之一。如果外文好,当然可以在网络上找到海量的论坛帖子,但是相对于这些信息,我更愿意信服这些专门研究拿破仑战争的历史学家通过几年甚至几十年的辛勤研究,走遍拿破仑所经历的地方,查阅海量档案并做出的严肃分析,我个人更倾向于这些著作,并且愿意把这些信息在这里分享。你提的对的意见我会虚心接受,比如中央战略问题我确实没有这意到,通过与你的交流确实觉得你对拿破仑战争非常熟悉,但是每个都有自己的局限性,我们毕竟都不是专业的历史学家,为了输赢而一直这么循环抬杠下去,我觉得一点意义也没有。
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 楼主| 发表于 2018-12-30 08:49:43 | 显示全部楼层
你质疑对内伊的评价,我列出了拿破仑对内伊的评价,你说拿破仑是找内伊背锅,我真的不知道该怎么再继续回答了,要是想搞清楚拿破仑是不是诋毁内伊只好回到1815年去问拿破仑自己好了。还有你说1809年格鲁希就应该封帅,但是事实上1809年之后至1814年,拿破仑提拔了多位元帅其中并没有格鲁希,这还是在格鲁希参与了其中很多战役的情况下。格鲁希是否合格当元帅,我根本没有和你讨论这个观点,因为这本来就是很主观的,你说了不算拿破仑说了算,对吧?每个人的看法都不一样争论这个有什么意义呢。我列出的是格鲁希封元帅遭到了当时很多人的反对,其中也包括了很多同袍将领,这是有资料可查的事实。旺达姆是刺头不假,但是打仗不是敲键盘,战争中服从命令是非常重要的,尤其是在战役中决定战争胜负关键的时刻。吉拉德对格鲁希的当众咒骂,旺达姆战役中完全不听指挥可以得出大概率结论,吉拉德和旺达姆根本就不服格鲁希这个元帅。这也是瓦富爾战役进展不顺利的原因。
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 楼主| 发表于 2018-12-30 08:57:12 | 显示全部楼层
iron duke 发表于 2018-12-29 17:05
奈伊指挥大兵团作战是有其缺陷不错,但两个军加一个骑兵军的左翼,跟其在吕岑指挥的一个大号军不过半斤八两 ...

我讨论的内伊的缺点重点根本不在能指挥多少人,而是作为侧翼指挥官应该具备完整领会拿破仑的1815年战略意图的眼光,可是内伊在四臂村的行为完全看不出来,他不顾一切召回戴尔隆的行为其实是一个无法原谅的错误,这有很多中解读我会在后面提到,但是一个充分理解拿破仑战略企图的指挥官是不会做出这么愚蠢的举动的。
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发表于 2018-12-30 09:08:29 | 显示全部楼层
@高守业 发个贴子

曾经有一次在外文论坛上和别人讨论威灵顿对于康斯坦-勒贝克15日违背他的命令是什么态度,因为他一直都不喜欢自己的手下发挥主动性。当时我回复说:
I don't know what Wellington said to Constant, but if the Prince of Sachsen-Weimar, the man who disobeyed Wellington's order at first can be trusted

It was between 5 and 6 o'clock in the morning that the Prince of Orange arrived and General de Perponcher explained our position to him. The prince announced that we would soon be supported by part of the English army; he moved several of the battalions in to a position closer to the enemy, and had our front covered by a line of skirmishers, who hid in the tall wheat. The morning of the 16th was quiet, although a few cannon shots were exchanged. The rest of the 1st Brigade of our division having moved up, mine was scattered around to the extreme right of the road through Quatre Bras. We had just heard cannon fire from the battle of Ligny when the Duke of Wellington arrived with his staff, accompanied by the Duke of Brunswick, who shortly after died a glorious death. It was then that I saw the Duke of Wellington for the first time, to whom I was introduced by the Prince of Orange. I was struck by the bad tone the Duke affected, he did not even address a single word to me and turned his back to me for some time.

As you can see my dear captain, my account of the events at the beginning of the day differs essentially from those that have been published officially, accounts which give credit to our present king, concerning the maintenance of the position at Quatre Bras. Through my account you can see that this was in fact only due to the-brave actions of General de Perponcher. Despite my account contradicting that of the Duke of Wellington, and even an article I found last autumn in the Handelsblad, I give you my word of honour, my dear sir, that the above as told to you is the simplest and purest truth.

John Franklin, Waterloo Netherlands Correspondence: v. 1 p. 81

It is often told Wellington was reluctant to give his lieutenants free rein. If people showed initiative without orders they were liable to be reprimanded at least.
But the question is, Wellington knew the situation himself, he was still not very happy with what the prince had done.
So why?
I think the reason is that Constant's message to Wellington that the French had reached Quatre Bras, only twenty miles from Brussels, exaggerated the danger. Though he may design it to jolt his superiors out of their complacency. But when the Duke reached the height behind Frasnes the next morning, what he found was "I do not see many of the enemy in front of us… Nothing has been seen in the direction of Binche, nor on our right."
It seems the urgency in the message he receieved last night totally disappeared.
So that may be why Wellington is not happy.

然后又详细说了,威灵顿为什么会不高兴,以及他为什么要在尼韦勒而不是四臂村集结军队的原因:
I think we can take this question more seriously and widerly.
There used to be a debate over the mistakes Wellington committed in the early stage of the campaign.
Certain historians, Mr. Peter Hofschröer especially, think Wellington wrongly asked his troops at Quatre-Bras in the so called After Order to concentrate in the vicinity of Nivelles, leave the road to Brussels totally unprotected. Wellington should thank Constant and the Prince of Sachsen-Weimar for their initiative which saved his reputation.
So, the question is why Wellington ordered his unites to concentrate at Nivelles, what he thought when he received Constant's message, and his opinion when reached the battlefield himself.
The answer to the first question is obviously, Nivelles is a major town behind the front line. And to the contrary, the vital crossroad Quatre-Bras is not marked on most map of that time. And it was General Zieten, the Prussian front line commander that requested him to concentrate there. In a message to Blücher in the morning of 15th June, Zieten wrote “I have informed the Duke of Wellington of this and have entreated him to concentrate his troops without delay near Nivelles, which according to the report received from General von Muffling yesterday he will do.” Furthermore, Mr. Gregory W. Pedlow pointed out in his On Waterloo: Clausewitz, Wellington, and the Campaign of 1815 that, the Prussians had previously announced their intention to defend the Sambre crossings and—if a retreat from Charleroi became necessary—to concentrate at Gosselies. This meant that they would be covering the portion of the Allied line in front of Quatre-Bras. In fact Wellington's decision was the result of the Prussians' failure to keep him informed of their movements. Quatre Bras only took on strategic importance when Zieten abandoned his position at Gosselies, thus opening the road to Brussels.
When Wellington read Constant's message that the French had reached Quatre Bras, only twenty miles from Brussels, he may think his Prussian allies deceived him, or more likely, the Prussian on the first line were crushed by Napoleon. No matter what he thought, the Duke was totally shocked by the result. And the After Order which issued hours ago fits in exactly with Napoleon's wishes. That may be why he would say “Napoleon has humbugged me, by God, he has gained twenty-four hours march on me.” (If this sentence really exists in history. )
Although Constant and the Prince of Sachsen-Weimar saved Wellington's reputation to some degree. When the Duke reached the battlefield himself and found there were not many French in front of him, thanks to Ney's inactive that morning, it seems his behaviour towards the Prince of Sachsen-Weimar is quite reasonable. The Netherlanders had identified their opposition as chasseurs, lancers and horse artillery of the Guard with some infantry of the line; this led the officers gathered at Quatre Bras to admit, somewhat sheepishly, that this might be merely a strong reconnaissance by the French.
Only when the Duke came back from his meeting with the Prussian and heard the thunderous cannonading did he realize the urgency of the situation. But since then he was pretty occupied, may have no time or chance to say something to the Prince of Sachsen-Weimar.
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 楼主| 发表于 2018-12-30 09:15:44 | 显示全部楼层
iron duke, 我觉得你非常熟悉拿破仑战争历史,大家都是拿破仑战争爱好者,很高兴能够和你讨论问题,也增长了我的知识。我还是希望大家能够进行有意义的讨论,这样也可以通过切磋而受益。如果只是为了争输赢而争,我真不想费时间下去了。比如内伊是否在滑铁卢战役中表现失常,格鲁希是否适合封元帅还是不要在循环了,这些主观的问题永远没有结论,否则就是讨论到明年也讨论不完。如果你认为我哪条史实不对,欢迎质疑并请贴出出处。我在这里开贴是为了分享最近出版的滑铁卢战役研的一些成果,对与不对大家自己分析,我尽量列出占多数的观点,今后也会避免使用太肯定的语气词,谢谢参与讨论。
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 楼主| 发表于 2018-12-30 09:38:25 | 显示全部楼层
下面列出我参考的部分书目:

1. 拿破仑大帝 (安德鲁•罗伯茨)
2. Waterloo Battlefield Guide by David Buttery
3. 西洋军事史 (富歇)
4. Wellington: Waterloo and the Fortunes of Peace 1814–1852 by Rory Muir  (此人研究威灵顿近30年,只是这本威灵顿后半生的传记竟有728页厚)
5.Prelude to Waterloo: Quatre Bras: The French Perspective by Andrew Field
6. Waterloo: The French Perspective by Andrew Field
7. Grouchy's Waterloo: The Battles of Ligny and Wavre by Andrew Field
8. Waterloo: Rout and Retreat: The French Perspective  by Andrew Field
Andrew Field这套研究滑铁卢战役的四本系列(5,6,7,8) 我个人很喜欢,作者本人曾是军人,对其中很多的军事相关的细节有很深入的研究,另外作者的这套书是基于稀缺的法方资料编著成的,有不错的参考价值)
9. 最漫长的下午:决定滑铁卢战役的400勇士 布伦丹·西姆斯
10. Waterloo: The Campaign of 1815: Volume I: From Elba to Ligny and Quatre Bras by John Hussey
11. Waterloo: The Campaign of 1815: Volume II: From Waterloo to the Restoration of Peace in Europe by John Hussey
John Hussey 研究滑铁卢战役的上下两卷研究滑铁卢战役是2018年的最新著作,这部书非常详细可以说是研究滑铁卢战役的到目前最详尽的著作,非常推荐阅读。
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 楼主| 发表于 2018-12-30 09:51:46 | 显示全部楼层
Gustavus 发表于 2018-12-30 08:12
Six, Dictionnaire biographique des généraux et amiraux français de la Révolution et de l ...

可是欧仁在1804年并没有指挥元帅。我相信他在后来的战役中能指挥元帅最重要的原因是因为他的亲王身份而并非他的将军身份。我个人不认为拿破仑时期的现役元帅只是荣誉身份,一个元帅可以随意被将军指挥是非常非常小概率的事情。法兰西元帅在拿破仑战争中就是军队的最高军衔,军功是晋升元帅最重要的因素,元帅在军队中的地位高于将军,这个事实还要再争来争去真的没有意思了。否则拿破仑也没必要再晋升格鲁希为元帅了。
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 楼主| 发表于 2018-12-30 10:06:06 | 显示全部楼层
Gustavus 发表于 2018-12-30 09:08
代@高守业 发个贴子

曾经有一次在外文论坛上和别人讨论威灵顿对于康斯坦-勒贝克15日违背他的命令是什么 ...

威灵顿对于拿破仑入侵比利时反映迟缓的论述来自于 Wellington: Waterloo and the Fortunes of Peace 1814–1852 by Rory Muir  (此人研究威灵顿近30年,这本书被认为是研究威灵顿的权威著作),事实上拿破仑在1815年入侵比利时的行动其实是很成功的,基本达到了战略的突然性,这也是他的12万人能对总数22万人的英普军队占据先机的重要原因,我的这本书只有纸质版没有电子版,如果实在需要印证我只好逐页拍照片发上来了。
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发表于 2018-12-30 10:28:14 来自手机 | 显示全部楼层
奈伊的左翼,纸面上也不过四万六,跟吕岑战役他指挥的第三军人数一样。注意,四万六不过是纸面上,实际上四臂村奈伊指挥的是多少呢,第七师被拿破仑用到利尼去了,少了四千。克勒曼军从沙勒罗瓦大老远过来,只来得及赶到一个旅。第一军因主动消失,四臂村战役只象征性参加了一下,负伤军官一名。OK,奈伊实际指挥多少? 两万一,勉强够一个1815的军。纸面不过1813一个第三军,实际一个1815第二军的指挥,去套大兵团这才是抬杠吧。
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发表于 2018-12-30 10:28:38 来自手机 | 显示全部楼层
奈伊的左翼,纸面上也不过四万六,跟吕岑战役他指挥的第三军人数一样。注意,四万六不过是纸面上,实际上四臂村奈伊指挥的是多少呢,第七师被拿破仑用到利尼去了,少了四千。克勒曼军从沙勒罗瓦大老远过来,只来得及赶到一个旅。第一军因主动消失,四臂村战役只象征性参加了一下,负伤军官一名。OK,奈伊实际指挥多少? 两万一,勉强够一个1815的军。纸面不过1813一个第三军,实际一个1815第二军的指挥,去套大兵团这才是抬杠吧。
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