本帖最后由 拉摩的侄儿 于 2018-12-30 22:41 编辑
以前和上文提到的某个作者讨论过,为什么拿破仑没有预料到普鲁士军队会出现在滑铁卢,按照他那种咖位,即使几率再小,也应该考虑进去的。
当时我是试着这么解释的:
In Soult’s first order to Grouchy that day, he mentioned a strong Prussian column had been retreating through Gentinnes. However, it was presented almost in passing, without any reference to its possible significance. I think Soult certainly knew their intentions, which did not conflict with Grouchy’s suggestions in his report last night; otherwise, he would not make no further comment on this column.
This clue was found by Milhaud at Marbais last day. And this raise us another question, how Napoleon got the idea the Prussian was heading for Wavre, but not to unite with the English at a place south of Brussels (e.g. crossing Dyle at Moustier to join Wellington at Waterloo) ? An experienced commander like Napoleon and Soult would not rule out that possibility. As we all know, during the early part of Waterloo, the Emperor and his CoS had never took the Prussian intervention into their consideration until the captured Prussian courier revealing Bülow’s Corps was near at hand.
In General Berton’s account pp. 49-50, he claimed Domon was detached to scout along the left bank of the Dyle on the 17th. The 4th Regiment of Chasseurs passed the bridge at Moustier and skirmished with the Prussian cavalry there. General Berton was not present, but it is not impossible that this did occur. If he told the truth, I think the questions above can be solved. Compared with Wavre, Moustier was a more logical place for the Prussian to cross the Dyle to join Wellington. If the Prussian column that retreated through Gentinnes did not cross the Dyle there, the possibility of the union of two coalition armies at Waterloo can be significantly reduced.
Marbot’s 1830 letter was questioned by many, especially its details are impossible to match with the Prussian event. No doubt, he exaggerated his mission. However, it is unlikely he told Grouchy a falsehood without a modicum of truth in it. For this question, Mr. Dawson suggests the possibility of course exists that Marbot got his timings very wrong. If he set off in the early morning but not at 11 O’clock, it seems much of his account can be reconciled with the known event, and corroborate Berton’s observations. If Domon had been at Moustier on 17 June and had spotted Prussians, it made sense for another patrol to be sent out to double check Domon’s report. Clearly, what Marbot had found at Moustier, Domon’s and Grouchy’s report of last night made Napoleon and Soult draw the conclusion that the Prussian column that retreated through Gentinnes had headed for Wavre, and believe Blücher had no intention to unite with Wellington at Waterloo.
其中关于马尔博那封信新的解读方式来自Paul L. Dawson的Napoleon and Grouchy: The Last Great Waterloo Mystery Unravelled
接着:
Napoleon certainly realized the possibility of the union of two coalition armies, which was implied in the Bertrand order. When he learned a strong Prussian column was retreating in a different route in the afternoon of 17th, he must be alert. It was a great mistake he did not forward this news to Grouchy early, but we can suppose between the time this column was spotted and Soult drew the conclusion that they were heading for Warve, some measures were taken. And Berton’s observation was the only event that I find may fill the gap.
In the later afternoon and early evening of 17th, Napoleon certainly had no idea whether Wellington would stand at Waterloo or retreat again towards Brussels, but Domon’s finding at Moustier highly suggested if Wellington chose to stand, he would probably fight alone. Since the nearest Prussian force (I and II Prussian Corps in fact) that had retreated through Gentinnes had no intention to take a direct route (e.g. crossing the Dyle at Moustier) to link up with Wellington, how would the other parts of the Prussian army?
I think Napoleon’s third order to Grouchy contains something very important but was overlooked before. Giving the fact another Prussian column had taken a difference route and was out of contact with Grouchy’s force, an experienced commander like Napoleon and Soult would certainly consider the possibility of the union of two coalition armies at the present location, but Domon’s and perhaps Marbot’s report convinced them it was unlikely.
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