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[原创] 拿破仑的最后一战滑铁卢战役总结与研究

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发表于 2018-12-30 22:14:56 来自手机 | 显示全部楼层
再说一遍,要讨论就认真点,拿点凭据。伸手倒还少见这么颠三倒四的呢。
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发表于 2018-12-30 22:18:22 来自手机 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 拉摩的侄儿 于 2018-12-30 22:41 编辑

以前和上文提到的某个作者讨论过,为什么拿破仑没有预料到普鲁士军队会出现在滑铁卢,按照他那种咖位,即使几率再小,也应该考虑进去的。

当时我是试着这么解释的:

In Soult’s first order to Grouchy that day, he mentioned a strong Prussian column had been retreating through Gentinnes. However, it was presented almost in passing, without any reference to its possible significance. I think Soult certainly knew their intentions, which did not conflict with Grouchy’s suggestions in his report last night; otherwise, he would not make no further comment on this column.
This clue was found by Milhaud at Marbais last day. And this raise us another question, how Napoleon got the idea the Prussian was heading for Wavre, but not to unite with the English at a place south of Brussels (e.g. crossing Dyle at Moustier to join Wellington at Waterloo) ? An experienced commander like Napoleon and Soult would not rule out that possibility. As we all know, during the early part of Waterloo, the Emperor and his CoS had never took the Prussian intervention into their consideration until the captured Prussian courier revealing Bülow’s Corps was near at hand.
In General Berton’s account pp. 49-50, he claimed Domon was detached to scout along the left bank of the Dyle on the 17th. The 4th Regiment of Chasseurs passed the bridge at Moustier and skirmished with the Prussian cavalry there. General Berton was not present, but it is not impossible that this did occur. If he told the truth, I think the questions above can be solved. Compared with Wavre, Moustier was a more logical place for the Prussian to cross the Dyle to join Wellington. If the Prussian column that retreated through Gentinnes did not cross the Dyle there, the possibility of the union of two coalition armies at Waterloo can be significantly reduced.
Marbot’s 1830 letter was questioned by many, especially its details are impossible to match with the Prussian event. No doubt, he exaggerated his mission. However, it is unlikely he told Grouchy a falsehood without a modicum of truth in it. For this question, Mr. Dawson suggests the possibility of course exists that Marbot got his timings very wrong. If he set off in the early morning but not at 11 O’clock, it seems much of his account can be reconciled with the known event, and corroborate Berton’s observations. If Domon had been at Moustier on 17 June and had spotted Prussians, it made sense for another patrol to be sent out to double check Domon’s report. Clearly, what Marbot had found at Moustier, Domon’s and Grouchy’s report of last night made Napoleon and Soult draw the conclusion that the Prussian column that retreated through Gentinnes had headed for Wavre, and believe Blücher had no intention to unite with Wellington at Waterloo.


其中关于马尔博那封信新的解读方式来自Paul L. Dawson的Napoleon and Grouchy: The Last Great Waterloo Mystery Unravelled
接着:

Napoleon certainly realized the possibility of the union of two coalition armies, which was implied in the Bertrand order. When he learned a strong Prussian column was retreating in a different route in the afternoon of 17th, he must be alert. It was a great mistake he did not forward this news to Grouchy early, but we can suppose between the time this column was spotted and Soult drew the conclusion that they were heading for Warve, some measures were taken. And Berton’s observation was the only event that I find may fill the gap.


In the later afternoon and early evening of 17th, Napoleon certainly had no idea whether Wellington would stand at Waterloo or retreat again towards Brussels, but Domon’s finding at Moustier highly suggested if Wellington chose to stand, he would probably fight alone. Since the nearest Prussian force (I and II Prussian Corps in fact) that had retreated through Gentinnes had no intention to take a direct route (e.g. crossing the Dyle at Moustier) to link up with Wellington, how would the other parts of the Prussian army?


I think Napoleon’s third order to Grouchy contains something very important but was overlooked before. Giving the fact another Prussian column had taken a difference route and was out of contact with Grouchy’s force, an experienced commander like Napoleon and Soult would certainly consider the possibility of the union of two coalition armies at the present location, but Domon’s and perhaps Marbot’s report convinced them it was unlikely.



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发表于 2018-12-30 22:35:25 来自手机 | 显示全部楼层
公社战士 发表于 2018-12-30 22:12
当时他都没有说过赶不及,十九号已经是事后了,知道吗?这个是格鲁希自己推卸责任的说辞。吴赛肯定知道路 ...

怎知是说辞呢。在瓦兰炮兵司令巴尔蒂已经先说出来了到不了,格鲁希可是科班炮兵出身。而且耳力还贼一点,判断是后卫战,和当时四十来门炮的规模相符
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发表于 2018-12-30 22:43:05 来自手机 | 显示全部楼层
拉摩的侄儿 发表于 2018-12-30 22:18
以前和上文提到的某个作者讨论过,为什么拿破仑没有预料到普鲁士军队会出现在滑铁卢,按照他那种咖位,即使 ...

这是个问题。同样,“公认”大兵团指挥能力强的苏参在从弗勒吕斯过来路遇格鲁希时,也表示普军不足为虑,让帕若尔和特斯特盯梢就差不多了。我认为这是因为拿和苏在中线,这段普军败的场面“如同一场舞台剧”(苏帅给达武的信之词),干扰了对普的整体判断。还有就是被俘的吕佐夫的诉苦大概也起了些作用。
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发表于 2018-12-30 22:46:27 来自手机 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 公社战士 于 2018-12-30 22:50 编辑
iron duke 发表于 2018-12-30 22:35
怎知是说辞呢。在瓦兰炮兵司令巴尔蒂已经先说出来了到不了,格鲁希可是科班炮兵出身。而且耳力还贼一点, ...

人家根本就没有打算拦截普军,就等于人家知道赶不到,所以打后卫?这样白帮忙了呀。我从逻辑上指出问题,你还来了个伸手,最重要的是他没有走过,就等于赶不到了?你帮上帝做决定?何况有不少专家认为可以赶到,你的或者是他的都算一家之言,吴赛等等当然算。
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发表于 2018-12-30 22:58:06 来自手机 | 显示全部楼层
公社战士 发表于 2018-12-30 22:46
人家根本就没有打算拦截普军,就等于人家知道赶不到,所以打后卫?这样白帮忙了呀。我从逻辑上指出问题, ...

没打算拦截?格鲁希十九日早的报告有吧。格鲁希的情报是普大队人马在卢万那个方向,在瓦弗等于截住了一大部分。往滑铁卢那边支援的可能也有,格鲁希的副官给四军传令说的啥,吴塞也写了吧。
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发表于 2018-12-30 23:11:03 来自手机 | 显示全部楼层
拉摩的侄儿 发表于 2018-12-30 22:18
以前和上文提到的某个作者讨论过,为什么拿破仑没有预料到普鲁士军队会出现在滑铁卢,按照他那种咖位,即使 ...

多蒙和大嘴的侦查报告看来也是个影响,连接威灵顿最便捷的路能走而没走。当时威灵顿确实还有另一个选择,就是十七日早晨对普军信使说的备选计划,如果普不能保证至少一个军增援,将撤到布鲁塞尔北寻求汇合。无论拿破仑还是格鲁希都“支持”这个计划,拿在圣岛说公爵在不易后撤的苏瓦纳森林前布阵拿国家利益当儿戏,格鲁希十九日报告在设想“阻止”英普汇合于布鲁塞尔。
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发表于 2018-12-30 23:16:39 | 显示全部楼层
按照Gareth Glover的Waterloo-Myth and Reality的说法

原本威灵顿的战略枢轴是尼维勒,因为他的军队预定是以该地为军队集中点(尼维勒大致在各军位置的中心),所以他没有认识到四臂村有多重要,而拿破仑所了解的是威灵顿军队部署在西北方,布吕歇尔军队在东方,他事前不知道布吕歇尔企图在里尼抵抗,所以拿破仑也没有觉得四臂村很重要。因此他不太可能在6月15日命令奈伊夺取四臂村。
16日上午10点威灵顿来到四臂村,他发现四臂村很安全,因此他仍然怀疑拿破仑对他的攻击会来自芒斯地区,10点半他给布吕歇尔写了短信(就是著名的弗拉斯内信件),在信中他说他的骑兵中午到达尼维勒,下午2点就能到四臂村,这封信可能误导了布吕歇尔,促使他在里尼抵抗拿破仑。这样四臂村变得重要了。事后威灵顿辩解说“在我眼前没有看到多少敌人……从班什一侧到我的右侧,什么都没有看到”
15日,法军在四臂村前兵力确实不多,问题在于16日上午,奈伊没有采取行动,直到他受到拿破仑的确切命令。那么16日上午雷内的第2军为什么没有采取行动?他在中午前都没有完成部署,直到下午1点才向四臂村攻击。如果上午,奈伊不等拿破仑的命令就主动行动,雷内能否行动得更快些呢?该书没有说。

至于格鲁希,在11点半前,他完全不知道拿破仑的位置,也不知道即将到来的滑铁卢战役,但11点半后,他没有采取行动阻挠布吕歇尔的行动,他应该在瓦福尔以西渡过迪莱河,向北推进,虽然他已经不可能阻止比洛第四军的行动,但起码应该阻止布吕歇尔其他军的行动。总之,虽然滑铁卢的失败不能怪格鲁希,但在战役已经确定的情况下,格鲁希对他的反应迟钝负有责任。
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发表于 2018-12-30 23:17:03 | 显示全部楼层
重复了,编辑掉
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发表于 2018-12-30 23:17:24 | 显示全部楼层
重复了,编辑掉
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