这也是一个不知道你想要辩论什么的问题。1815年法军的优缺点很多著作都有论述，我想你应该读过很多。以你这么丰富的知识，不知道你真这么认为法国人出于对法国的热爱上下铁板一块支持拿破仑，拿破仑可以随便选人，还是就是只要我说的观点你就要反过来说。我不跟你辩吧好像我是错的，跟你辩吧我要重复引证很多材料，太很费时间，这样下去就是把楼累100层也没有结果。问题是这样无意的争论实在不必要，我这个帖子想要论述的东西都还没有开始呢，就纠缠在这些我认为已经clear的部分。
关于1815年法军，以下Perhaps Houssaye的评价是经常引用多的：
Such was the army of 1815 – impressionable, critical, without discipline, and without confidence in its leaders, haunted by the dread of treason, and on that account perhaps, liable to sudden fits of panic; it was nevertheless, instinct with warlike aspirations and loving war for its own sake, fired with a thirst for vengeance; it was capable of heroic efforts and furious impulses; it was more impetuous, more excited, more eager for the fray than any other Republican or Imperial Army after or before it. Napoleon had never before handled an instrument of war, which was at once so formidable, and yet so fragile.
你列出例子说明法国法军上下如何不计前嫌对拿破仑很忠诚愿意战斗，可是相反的例子我这里也一大把, for example:
Captain de Brack of the Imperial Guard Lancers summed up the feeling of the army：
The French army of the Hundred Days was not of the pure imperial sort. Already the few months of peace and the Restoration had changed it; the passive obedience, silent, respectful, confident, had been impaired. Its march, on campaign, was no longer cheerful firmness, heedless of ill, enthusiastic, the first cause of our success. Selfishness and treason （背叛）circulated in its veins, and it had the feeling of their vile fever.
Once again, the writings after the battle were quick to identify its cause. Lemonnier-Delafosse:
Although the entire army was superb and full of enthusiasm, it was necessary to inject new blood into its leadership; but the emperor … made the mistake of putting it back under its old leaders. Most, despite their speeches to the king, had not ceased to speak in support of the imperial cause; but nevertheless they did not appear disposed to serve with the enthusiasm and devotion that the circumstances demanded. These were no longer the men who, full of youth and ambition, were generous with their lives to gain promotion and fame; they were men tired of war, and, having achieved the highest positions, enriched by the spoils of war or the generosity of Napoleon, had no other desire than to enjoy their fortune peacefully in the shadow of their laurels.
The shortcomings and doubtful loyalties of many senior officers were obvious to the many loyal generals. (引自Field, Andrew. Waterloo: The French Perspective ）
General Delort, who commanded a division of cuirassiers at Waterloo, later wrote:
Finally, a great number of generals and officers who had not only loyally served the king, but had also demonstrated a great devotion to him and to the princes of his family, were placed, by a bizarre twist of fortune, in a very difficult position, between the honour and love of his country, between the need that prescribed loyalty and the necessity to fight to support the dignity and independence of France. These strong conflicting motives in the hearts of the generals threw them into irresolution and discouragement.
Sergeant Mauduit summed up the feelings of the soldiers：
‘… a great fault had been committed, in employing certain commanders, for whom the words “glory” and “patrie” no longer had the same significance as for their subordinates....
‘Too many of our generals were no longer worthy of commanding such troops; some of them traitors (叛徒）on the inside, spoke against the triumph of our arms; others, incapable, indecisive and lacking spirit, went into battle half-heartedly.’
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楼主: 偶木散人
楼主
发表于 2019-1-1 08:06:22